United States v. Short
4 C.M.A. 437, 16 C.M.R. 11, 4 USCMA 437 (1954)
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Rule of Law:
For a conviction of a specific intent crime, such as assault with intent to commit rape, a defendant's honest but unreasonable mistake of fact regarding the victim's consent may negate the required specific intent (mens rea). The key element is the defendant's subjective state of mind, not the objective reasonableness of their belief or the victim's degree of resistance.
Facts:
- On November 28, 1952, at around 11:30 p.m. in Tokyo, Yayoi Tomobe and Tokiko Okano left their shop to dispose of waste paper in a public latrine.
- Private Short and his companion, Private O’Rourke, who were both intoxicated, approached the two women from behind.
- Frightened, Okano called out to Tomobe to run and fled back to the shop, but Tomobe tripped over a stone.
- As Tomobe regained her balance, Short caught her, pulled her into the latrine, closed the door, and began fondling her.
- Tomobe protested by saying "No" in Japanese and trying to push Short away, but he was too strong.
- The shop manager, alerted by Okano, went to the latrine and then summoned Japanese police from a nearby police box.
- The police forcibly removed Short from the latrine.
- Short maintained that he believed Tomobe was a prostitute with whom he had negotiated a price of 500 yen and that she had consensually entered the latrine with him.
Procedural Posture:
- A general court-martial in Japan convicted the accused, Private Short, of assault with intent to commit rape.
- The convening authority approved the findings but modified the sentence, reducing confinement from ten to five years.
- A board of review (intermediate appellate court) affirmed the conviction and the modified sentence.
- The United States Court of Military Appeals (the highest military court) granted review to consider the correctness of the law officer's instructions to the court.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's honest belief that the victim consented, even if that belief is unreasonable, negate the specific intent required for a conviction of assault with intent to commit rape?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Quinn
No, an honest but unreasonable belief does not negate the specific intent where the defense fails to properly request a jury instruction on the matter. The conviction is affirmed because the defense's requested instruction on mistake of fact was legally flawed, and the general instructions provided were adequate. The pivotal issue in assault with intent to rape is the state of mind of the accused at the time of the assault, not the extent of the woman's resistance. The defense's requested instruction on mistake of fact ('The guilt or innocence of the accused depends on the circumstances as they appear to him') was fatally flawed because it failed to require that the accused's belief be both honest and reasonable. While some of the law officer's instructions on the force required for rape might be incomplete for a consummated rape charge, they were not prejudicial in a case for assault with intent to rape when viewed with the instructions as a whole.
Concurring - Judge Latimer
No. The conviction should be affirmed, but on different grounds. While an inaccurate requested instruction can put a law officer on notice to give a correct one, it was not necessary here. The general instructions given to the court adequately covered the central issue. The court was presented with two conflicting narratives—the prosecution's evidence of an assault versus the accused's defense of consent—and the existing instructions were sufficient for the court to determine the facts and reach a verdict.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Judge Brosman
Yes, a defendant's honest but unreasonable belief can negate the required specific intent. The law officer's failure to properly instruct the court on this defense constitutes prejudicial error, and the case should be reheard. Assault with intent to commit rape is a specific intent crime, which differs from a general intent crime like rape. For a specific intent crime, even an unreasonable mistake of fact can negate the required mens rea if it shows the defendant did not actually form the specific intent to commit the crime. If the accused genuinely, though unreasonably, believed the victim was consenting, he would lack the specific intent 'to have unlawful sexual intercourse by force.' The defense's requested instruction, though imperfect, put the law officer on notice of this critical defense theory, and the general instructions did not cover it adequately.
Analysis:
This case is significant for its exploration of the mistake of fact defense as it applies to specific intent crimes versus general intent crimes. The dissenting opinion, in particular, articulates a crucial legal distinction: for crimes requiring a specific intent, the defendant's subjective belief is the dispositive factor, even if that belief is objectively unreasonable. This contrasts with general intent crimes, where a mistake of fact must typically be reasonable to serve as a defense. This decision, and especially Judge Brosman's dissent, provides a foundational framework for analyzing the mens rea element in specific intent offenses and has influenced subsequent legal reasoning in this area.
