United States v. Shaquille Robinson
846 F.3d 694 (2017)
Rule of Law:
A law enforcement officer may conduct a protective frisk of a lawfully stopped person if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed. The danger justifying the frisk arises from the combination of a forced police encounter and the presence of a weapon, not from the illegality of the weapon's possession.
Facts:
- An anonymous caller informed the Ranson, West Virginia Police Department that he had witnessed a Black male load a firearm and conceal it in his pocket in a 7-Eleven parking lot known for high levels of drug-trafficking activity.
- The caller stated the man, Shaquille Robinson, then entered the passenger side of a bluish-green Toyota Camry driven by a white woman, which left the parking lot.
- A police officer located the described vehicle a few minutes later, approximately three-quarters of a mile from the 7-Eleven.
- The officer observed that neither the driver nor the passenger, Robinson, were wearing seatbelts.
- The officer initiated a traffic stop based on the seatbelt violation.
- As Robinson was exiting the vehicle at an officer's request, Captain Roberts asked him if he had any weapons on him.
- Robinson did not respond verbally but gave the officer a look that the officer interpreted as an "'oh, crap' look."
- Captain Roberts then performed a frisk of Robinson and discovered a loaded firearm in his front pants pocket.
Procedural Posture:
- Shaquille Robinson was charged in U.S. District Court with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- Robinson filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing the frisk violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
- The district court, a court of first instance, denied the motion to suppress.
- Robinson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion.
- A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court, reversed the district court's decision, siding with Robinson.
- The government (appellee) petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the Fourth Circuit granted, vacating the panel's opinion and judgment.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a law enforcement officer violate the Fourth Amendment by frisking a lawfully stopped person whom the officer reasonably suspects is armed, regardless of whether the person may legally possess the firearm under state law?
Opinions:
Majority - Niemeyer, Circuit Judge
No, a law enforcement officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by frisking a lawfully stopped person whom the officer reasonably suspects is armed. The court held that the danger justifying a protective frisk arises from the combination of a forced police encounter, such as a traffic stop, and the presence of a weapon. Citing Terry v. Ohio and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the court reasoned that when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a lawfully stopped person is armed, that person is also considered dangerous for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis. The inherent dangers of traffic stops are heightened exponentially by the presence of a weapon, regardless of whether its possession is legal under state law. The court found it inconsequential that West Virginia law might have permitted Robinson to carry a concealed firearm, referencing Supreme Court precedent in Adams v. Williams that the purpose of a frisk is officer safety, not the discovery of evidence of a crime.
Dissenting - Harris, Circuit Judge
Yes, a law enforcement officer violates the Fourth Amendment by frisking a lawfully stopped person based solely on a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed in a jurisdiction where public carry is legal. The dissent argued that the majority's rule improperly collapses Terry's two distinct requirements of 'armed' and 'dangerous' into a single inquiry of 'armed.' In states like West Virginia that broadly permit citizens to carry firearms, the mere possession of a gun is presumptively lawful and does not, by itself, create a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness. Equating 'armed' with 'dangerous' erodes Fourth Amendment protections for law-abiding citizens exercising their rights and grants police unbridled discretion to conduct pretextual frisks, which could lead to discriminatory enforcement against minorities and those in high-crime areas.
Concurring - Wynn, Circuit Judge
No, the frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The concurrence agreed with the majority's conclusion but argued that the court should have been more direct by explicitly holding that individuals who are armed with a firearm are categorically 'dangerous' for the purpose of a Terry frisk. The majority's framing of 'armed and dangerous' as a unitary concept avoids the core issue: that choosing to carry a firearm, an inherently dangerous item, means sacrificing certain constitutional protections. This categorical dangerousness justifies the frisk of any lawfully stopped individual reasonably suspected of carrying a firearm.
Analysis:
This decision establishes in the Fourth Circuit that during a lawful stop, an officer's reasonable suspicion that a person is armed is a sufficient basis to also consider that person dangerous and conduct a protective frisk. It significantly clarifies the 'armed and dangerous' standard from Terry v. Ohio in the context of permissive state gun laws, prioritizing officer safety over the potential legality of the firearm possession. The ruling suggests that the exercise of Second Amendment rights to carry a firearm in public may result in diminished Fourth Amendment protections against searches during police encounters, creating a potential conflict between the two constitutional rights. This precedent strengthens police authority during traffic stops and will likely influence how similar cases are handled in jurisdictions with expanding gun rights.
Gunnerbot
AI-powered case assistant
Loaded: United States v. Shaquille Robinson (2017)
Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"