United States v. Scott Payne
1999 WL 409384, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13693, 181 F.3d 781 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A search of a parolee's property, which is permissible under the Fourth Amendment on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, is unconstitutional if that suspicion is based primarily on a stale, uncorroborated, anonymous tip that lacks any indicia of reliability, even when combined with the parolee's absconding from supervision.
Facts:
- Scott Payne was on parole under maximum supervision, which included a condition that he was subject to search and seizure if his parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe he possessed illegal contraband.
- Payne absconded from parole supervision by leaving his designated county, failing to report for office visits, and leaving his job without notifying his parole officer, Robert Burdette.
- Detective Jerry Smith of the Kentucky State Police received an uncorroborated, anonymous tip that Payne possessed a large quantity of methamphetamine in the trunk of his car.
- Over the next month and a half, Detective Smith and other drug enforcement officers were unable to find any evidence to corroborate the tip.
- Burdette obtained an arrest warrant for Payne for parole violations and relayed the uncorroborated drug tip to another parole officer, Dan Duvall.
- Duvall, accompanied by other parole officers and Detective Smith's drug unit, located and arrested Payne at the trailer of his estranged wife.
- After Payne was secured and removed from the scene, parole officer Duvall entered the trailer to conduct what he called a "plain-view search" and found a marijuana cigarette.
- Simultaneously, another parole officer, Russell McElroy, searched Payne's pickup truck and found another marijuana cigarette, a roach clip, and digital scales.
Procedural Posture:
- Scott Payne was charged in federal district court with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and being a felon in receipt of firearms.
- Payne filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the trailer and truck, arguing the searches were unconstitutional.
- The district court denied the motion to suppress, ruling that the initial searches were supported by reasonable suspicion.
- Following a trial, a jury acquitted Payne on the methamphetamine charge but convicted him on the marijuana and firearms counts.
- Payne appealed his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a parole officer's search of a parolee's residence and vehicle, based on a six-week-old, uncorroborated anonymous tip and the parolee's violation of parole conditions, violate the Fourth Amendment because it lacks reasonable suspicion?
Opinions:
Majority - Moore, J.
Yes. The search of the trailer and Payne's truck violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not justified by a reasonable suspicion that he possessed contraband. The totality of the circumstances did not support a reasonable suspicion because the primary basis for the search was a six-week-old, anonymous, and uncorroborated tip that lacked any indicia of reliability. The tip failed to provide details or predict future actions, and a month-long investigation failed to substantiate it. While Payne's absconding from parole and his criminal history are relevant, they are insufficient to elevate a stale and unreliable tip to the level of reasonable suspicion required for a search for contraband. Because the officers lacked a valid legal reason to be in the places from which they observed the contraband, the search cannot be justified.
Dissenting - Kennedy, J.
No. The search did not violate the Constitution because the parole officers had reasonable suspicion under the standard set forth in Griffin v. Wisconsin. The analysis should not focus solely on the tip but on the totality of the circumstances, which includes Payne's status as a parolee, his prior drug offenses, and his clear absconding from supervision. The combination of the tip (even if old), Payne's failure to report, his move to another county, and leaving his job created a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in illegal activities and likely possessed contraband. The majority errs by applying a reasonable suspicion standard applicable to ordinary citizens and failing to give proper weight to the special context of parole supervision.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the limits of the 'reasonable suspicion' standard for parolee searches, emphasizing that a parolee's diminished Fourth Amendment rights are not extinguished. It establishes that the standard, while lower than probable cause, still requires articulable facts that provide a particularized and objective basis for suspicion. The court's holding prevents law enforcement from using parole status as a pretext to conduct searches based on stale, unreliable information that could not otherwise be pursued. This case reinforces that every element contributing to suspicion, including tips, must be critically evaluated for reliability and timeliness, thereby protecting parolees from arbitrary searches.
