United States v. Scott
437 U.S. 82 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not bar a government appeal from a mid-trial dismissal of an indictment when the defendant successfully moves to terminate the proceedings on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.
Facts:
- John Scott was a police officer in Muskegon, Michigan.
- On March 5, 1975, Scott was indicted on three counts of distributing narcotics.
- Two of the counts concerned transactions that allegedly took place during the preceding September.
- Scott contended that the delay between the alleged criminal acts and the indictment prejudiced his ability to mount a defense.
Procedural Posture:
- John Scott was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan (a federal trial court) on three counts of narcotics distribution.
- Before and during the trial, Scott moved to dismiss two counts, arguing pre-indictment delay had prejudiced his defense.
- At the close of all evidence, the trial court granted Scott's motion and dismissed the first two counts.
- The third count was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict of not guilty.
- The Government, as appellant, appealed the dismissal of the first two counts to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the Government's appeal, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred further prosecution of Scott, the appellee.
- The Government then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the dismissal of the first count.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar the government from appealing a trial court's decision to grant a defendant's mid-trial motion to dismiss an indictment on the grounds of pre-indictment delay?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a government appeal in this circumstance. When a defendant voluntarily chooses to seek termination of a trial on grounds that are not related to a determination of factual guilt or innocence, the government is not prohibited from appealing that decision. The core protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent government oppression through repeated attempts to convict, particularly after an acquittal. An acquittal is a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. Here, the dismissal was based on pre-indictment delay, a legal claim that does not involve an adjudication of the defendant's guilt. Because Scott himself sought to end the trial without a verdict on the merits, he was neither acquitted nor convicted, and allowing a government appeal does not subject him to the kind of prosecutorial overreach the Clause was designed to prevent. This decision overrules the contrary holding in United States v. Jenkins.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes. The Double Jeopardy Clause should bar the government's appeal. The majority creates an unsupportable and unworkable distinction between 'true acquittals' and other mid-trial dismissals favorable to the accused. The fundamental purpose of the Clause is to protect an individual from the ordeal and risk of multiple trials for the same offense once jeopardy has attached. The dismissal in this case, based on evidence adduced at trial, was a final termination of the proceedings in the defendant's favor. Distinguishing this from a dismissal based on insanity or entrapment—which the majority concedes would be an acquittal—is arbitrary and provides no meaningful guidance for lower courts. The principle established in United States v. Jenkins was correct and should not be overruled, as any reversal here would necessarily require further factual proceedings, which is what the Clause prohibits.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinterprets the scope of Double Jeopardy protection by focusing on the reason for the termination of the trial. By overruling United States v. Jenkins, the Court shifted the analysis from whether a successful appeal would require a retrial to whether the dismissal was based on the defendant's factual guilt or innocence. This creates a critical distinction: a defendant-initiated dismissal on procedural or constitutional grounds (like pre-indictment delay) does not bar a government appeal, whereas a dismissal constituting an acquittal on the merits (like insufficiency of evidence) does. This ruling strengthens the government's ability to appeal erroneous mid-trial dismissals and places the risk of a second trial on defendants who choose to seek termination on grounds unrelated to the merits of their case.
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