United States v. Schrader
1993 WL 497251, 10 F.3d 1345 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
The adverb 'forcibly' in 18 U.S.C. § 111 modifies all subsequent verbs in the statute, requiring the government to prove the use of force for any charged act, including resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer, not just for assault.
Facts:
- Oglala Sioux tribal officers Richard Greenwald and John Long responded to a disturbance report at a residence on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.
- Minutes later, they located the suspects, including Charles Schrader, Lisa High Wolf, Clayton High Wolf, and Shaun Keith, at a nearby house where another disturbance had been reported.
- Officer Greenwald attempted to arrest Clayton High Wolf, who struggled physically before being handcuffed and placed in the police car.
- While Officer Long was attempting to arrest Shaun Keith, who tried to flee, Lisa High Wolf opened the police car door where Clayton High Wolf was seated, allowing him to start exiting.
- Lisa High Wolf then started the defendants' car and began to drive forward, ignoring an officer's command to stop.
- Charles Schrader exited the car, removed his jacket, and advanced towards the officers.
- In the ensuing confusion, Shaun Keith broke free, fled, and verbally threatened to kill the pursuing officer while reaching into his jacket.
- Two hours later, police located and arrested Lisa High Wolf and Charles Schrader; Schrader struggled with officers until they brandished a shotgun.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Schrader, Lisa High Wolf, Clayton High Wolf, and Shaun Keith were charged in the U.S. District Court with violating 18 U.S.C. § 111.
- The defendants filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the charges, arguing the tribal officers were not federal officers for the purpose of the statute; the district court denied the motion.
- Following a trial, the jury returned verdicts convicting all defendants.
- The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing, among other things, that the trial court gave the jury an incorrect instruction on the law.
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Issue:
Did the district court commit reversible error by instructing the jury that the adverb 'forcibly' in 18 U.S.C. § 111 modifies only the verb 'assaults' and not the other prohibited acts listed in the statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Loken, Circuit Judge.
Yes. The district court committed reversible error because the adverb 'forcibly' was intended to modify each of the verbs that succeed it in 18 U.S.C. § 111. The court reasoned that both statutory construction and precedent, including its own decision in United States v. Camp, confirm that force is a necessary element for all actions prohibited by the statute, not just assault. The error was not harmless because the element of force was a crucial issue at trial. By removing the force requirement for acts like resisting or impeding, the instruction allowed the jury to convict the defendants based on their own admissions of non-forcible conduct, thereby failing to adequately advise the jury of the essential elements of the crime.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Beam, Circuit Judge.
No. While the district court's instruction on the word 'forcibly' was erroneous, the error was harmless under the facts of this case and does not warrant reversing the convictions. The author concurs with the majority's conclusions on all other issues but dissents from the reversal, believing the evidence of forcible conduct was sufficient regardless of the flawed jury instruction.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a significant element of 18 U.S.C. § 111, establishing that the requirement of force applies to all prohibited conduct, not just assault. It prevents the statute from being interpreted so broadly as to criminalize passive resistance or minor, non-forcible interference with federal officers. The ruling raises the burden of proof for the government in these cases, requiring prosecutors to present evidence of force for any charged act under the statute, thereby protecting individuals from felony convictions for conduct that lacks a threatening or physically forceful nature.
