United States v. Scheffer
523 U.S. 303 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A per se rule excluding all polygraph evidence in criminal trials is not arbitrary or disproportionate and does not violate an accused's constitutional right to present a defense, as the government has legitimate interests in barring unreliable evidence, preserving the jury's role in determining credibility, and avoiding collateral litigation.
Facts:
- Edward Scheffer, an airman, volunteered to work as a drug informant for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI).
- OSI supervisors advised Scheffer that he would be subject to periodic drug testing and polygraph examinations.
- In early April 1992, Scheffer provided a urine sample at the request of an OSI agent.
- Shortly after providing the sample but before the results were known, Scheffer took a polygraph test where he denied using drugs; the examiner's opinion was that the test 'indicated no deception.'
- On April 30, it was learned that Scheffer's urinalysis revealed the presence of methamphetamine.
- Scheffer was subsequently charged with using methamphetamine, among other offenses.
- At his court-martial, Scheffer testified on his own behalf, claiming an 'innocent ingestion' theory and denying he had knowingly used drugs.
Procedural Posture:
- Edward Scheffer was tried by a general court-martial.
- At trial, the military judge denied Scheffer's motion to introduce polygraph evidence, relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707.
- Scheffer was convicted on all counts.
- Scheffer, as appellant, appealed to the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the conviction.
- Scheffer, as appellant, then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, in a 3-to-2 decision, reversed the conviction, holding that the per se exclusion of polygraph evidence violated Scheffer's Sixth Amendment right.
- The United States, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does Military Rule of Evidence 707, which creates a per se ban on the admission of polygraph evidence in court-martial proceedings, unconstitutionally abridge a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
No. Military Rule of Evidence 707 does not unconstitutionally abridge the right to present a defense. A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited and is subject to reasonable restrictions that serve legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. The rule serves three legitimate interests: 1) ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced, as there is no scientific consensus on the reliability of polygraph tests; 2) preserving the court members' core function of making credibility determinations, as the jury is the 'lie detector'; and 3) avoiding collateral litigation over the administration and interpretation of polygraph tests, which would distract from the central issue of guilt or innocence. Unlike the rules struck down in 'Rock', 'Washington', and 'Chambers', Rule 707 does not prevent the defendant from introducing factual evidence or testifying about his version of events; it merely bars expert opinion testimony aimed at bolstering his credibility, which does not significantly impair his defense.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Kennedy
No. The per se rule of exclusion is not unconstitutional, but the majority's reasoning is flawed. The continuing, good-faith disagreement among experts and courts regarding polygraph reliability is sufficient justification to uphold the rule against a constitutional challenge. However, the majority's additional rationale that polygraph evidence usurps the jury's role is a 'tired argument' that has been widely rejected by modern evidence rules, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a), which allows opinion testimony on ultimate issues. This reasoning demeans the competence of jurors and is unconvincing, especially in the military justice system where fact-finders are considered less likely to be unduly influenced by experts.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The per se exclusion of polygraph evidence violates the accused's constitutional right to present a defense. The Court's holding undervalues this fundamental right and overstates the government's interests. The polygraph results constitute independent factual evidence of the accused's 'consciousness of innocence' and are not merely opinion testimony to bolster credibility. The government's concerns are insufficient to justify a categorical ban: 1) polygraph evidence, with reliability rates between 70-90%, is often more reliable than other admissible evidence like eyewitness testimony; 2) juries are competent to assess the weight of expert testimony without being unduly influenced; and 3) the burden of collateral litigation is a routine aspect of admitting any expert testimony and cannot justify excluding evidence critical to the defense.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that a categorical ban on a type of scientific evidence, like polygraphs, is constitutionally permissible so long as the ban is not arbitrary or disproportionate to legitimate governmental interests. It distinguishes between the exclusion of core factual evidence (which may be unconstitutional) and the exclusion of expert opinion evidence offered to bolster credibility (which is permissible). The ruling provides a strong constitutional shield for jurisdictions that maintain per se bans on polygraph evidence, pushing back against the post-Daubert trend in some courts to consider admissibility on a case-by-case basis.
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