United States v. Sanford
429 U.S. 14 (1976) (1976)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial following a mistrial declared because of a hung jury. Consequently, the government may appeal a pre-retrial dismissal of an indictment without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, as a successful appeal would merely reinstate the proceedings for the single, permissible retrial.
Facts:
- Respondents engaged in game hunting within Yellowstone National Park.
- The U.S. Government contended that the hunting was illegal and secured an indictment against the respondents.
- Respondents argued that their hunting activities had been consented to by the Government.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondents were indicted for illegal game hunting and tried in the United States District Court for the District of Montana.
- The jury trial resulted in a hung jury, and the District Court declared a mistrial.
- Four months later, before a retrial commenced, the District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the indictment.
- The Government (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and respondents were the appellees.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the Government's appeal, holding that a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the appellate judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Serfass v. United States.
- On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its original decision.
- The Government again petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar the government from appealing a district court's dismissal of an indictment, where the dismissal occurred after a mistrial was declared due to a hung jury but before a second trial began?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government's appeal because a retrial following a mistrial due to a hung jury is constitutionally permissible. Jeopardy attached when the first jury was empaneled, but the trial did not end in the respondents' favor; it ended in a mistrial. Citing the long-standing precedent of United States v. Perez, the Court affirmed that a hung jury represents a 'manifest necessity' that justifies a mistrial and permits a retrial. Because the retrial itself is not barred by double jeopardy, the trial court's dismissal of the indictment prior to that retrial is appealable by the Government under the principles of Serfass v. United States. A successful government appeal in this context does not create a second jeopardy but merely allows the single, permissible continuation of the prosecution to proceed.
Dissenting - Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.
The dissent did not provide a legal rationale but stated its opposition to the Court's summary reversal of the case. Justices Brennan and Marshall would have set the case for full oral argument rather than deciding it summarily.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the specific procedural context of a post-mistrial, pre-retrial dismissal of an indictment. It strongly reaffirms the 'manifest necessity' doctrine from Perez, establishing that a hung jury does not terminate jeopardy in a way that benefits the defendant. By extending the logic of Serfass to this scenario, the Court solidifies the government's statutory right to appeal dismissals that are not functional acquittals, ensuring that legal errors by a trial court can be corrected without unconstitutionally subjecting a defendant to a second prosecution.
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