United States v. Samuel Mullet, Sr.
767 F.3d 585, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16532, 2014 FED App. 0210P (2014)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction under the federal Hate Crimes Prevention Act requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim's actual or perceived religion was a 'but-for' cause of the defendant's assault, not merely a 'significant motivating factor.'
Facts:
- Samuel Mullet established and served as bishop of the Bergholz Amish community in Ohio.
- In 2006, Mullet excommunicated several members who questioned his leadership, including the parents of Bergholz residents.
- A council of 300 Amish bishops from around the country met and unanimously voted to reverse Mullet's excommunications.
- Subsequently, a custody dispute resulted in Mullet's daughter, Wilma, losing her children to her ex-husband, who had left the Bergholz community.
- Believing this loss was due to their lack of faith, some Bergholz members began cutting their own hair and beards as a form of penance.
- Between September and November 2011, members of the Bergholz community carried out five separate attacks on nine other Amish individuals.
- The attacks consisted of forcibly cutting off the men's beards and the women's hair, which are sacred symbols of Amish identity and piety.
- The victims of the attacks were relatives of Bergholz members or were associated with the decision to overturn Mullet's excommunications.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted sixteen members of the Bergholz community for violating, and conspiring to violate, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act.
- The case was tried before a jury in the U.S. District Court.
- During the trial, the defendants requested a jury instruction defining the Act's 'because of' element as requiring 'but-for' causation.
- The district court rejected the defendants' proposed instruction and instead instructed the jury that the government only needed to prove the victim's religion was a 'significant motivating factor' for the assault.
- The jury convicted all sixteen defendants of at least one violation of the hate-crime statute.
- The sixteen defendants appealed their hate-crime convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the phrase 'because of' in the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act require the government to prove that the victim's religion was a but-for cause of the assault?
Opinions:
Majority - Sutton, Circuit Judge
Yes, the phrase 'because of' in the federal Hate Crimes Prevention Act requires proof of but-for causation. The district court's use of a 'significant motivating factor' standard was a reversible error. The Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States, decided after this trial, established that statutory terms like 'because of' require but-for causality in criminal law. This standard is consistent with the plain meaning of the text, provides the certainty required for criminal statutes with a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' burden of proof, and is supported by the rule of lenity. Any lesser standard risks unconstitutionally punishing a defendant's abstract beliefs rather than their bias-inspired conduct. The error was not harmless because the defendants' motive was the central, contested issue at trial. They presented substantial evidence of alternative, non-religious motives for the assaults, such as intra-family conflicts, disputes over parenting, and revenge for a child custody battle. A reasonable jury, properly instructed on the but-for standard, could have had reasonable doubt that the victims' religion was the determinative cause of the attacks.
Dissenting - Sargus, District Judge
Yes, while the majority is correct that 'because of' requires but-for causation, the district court's instructional error was harmless and the convictions should stand. The majority misapplies the but-for test by searching for a sole cause when the proper inquiry is whether religion was a but-for cause. The evidence is overwhelming and uncontested that the defendants chose the specific injury—forcibly cutting beards and hair—precisely because of its religious significance to the Amish victims. The assaults, in this form, would not have occurred but for the victims' religion, regardless of any other co-existing personal motives. Furthermore, the conviction against the ringleader, Samuel Mullet, Sr., should be upheld because he repeatedly confessed his religious motivation, stating on camera that 'it's all religion' and that he should be allowed to punish those who break church law. Given this confession and the absence of any contrary evidence regarding his motive, the error was harmless as to him.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the causation standard for the federal Hate Crimes Prevention Act, aligning it with the Supreme Court's stringent 'but-for' test articulated in Burrage. It raises the evidentiary burden for prosecutors in hate crime cases where multiple motives may be present, requiring them to prove that the victim's protected characteristic was the determinative factor, not just a significant one. The ruling emphasizes the critical distinction between a crime's method (which may involve religious symbolism) and its but-for motive, potentially making convictions more difficult in cases where personal animus is intertwined with bias. This precedent will force future courts and juries to more rigorously analyze a defendant's state of mind to ensure that convictions punish bias-motivated conduct rather than merely bigoted beliefs.
