United States v. Samora
PUBLISH April 8, 2020 (2020)
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Rule of Law:
To establish constructive possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the firearm; an erroneous jury instruction omitting the intent element constitutes plain error warranting a new trial if the evidence of intent is not overwhelming.
Facts:
- On May 26, 2017, Fernando Miguel Samora borrowed his ex-girlfriend’s car.
- Samora drove the car alone to a restaurant.
- As Samora left the restaurant and approached the vehicle, officers converged to arrest him on an outstanding warrant.
- Samora fled on foot, leading officers on a chase.
- Officers caught and arrested Samora.
- Officers searched the car Samora had been driving and found a loaded firearm inside the center console.
- DNA analysis of the firearm revealed Samora’s DNA as the "major profile," indicating he likely handled the gun at some point.
- Samora's ex-girlfriend, Maria Hernandez, testified the gun belonged to her, she kept it for home security, and she had placed it in the center console a couple of days before Samora borrowed the car.
Procedural Posture:
- The Government charged Fernando Miguel Samora with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- Samora proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the District of Utah.
- The district court instructed the jury on constructive possession, but it erroneously omitted the element that Samora must have intended to exercise control over the firearm.
- Neither Samora's counsel nor the Government objected to the district court's erroneous jury instruction.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict, convicting Samora.
- Samora (appellant) appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the Government presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction and that the erroneous jury instruction constituted plain error.
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Issue:
Does a district court's failure to instruct a jury on the "intent to exercise control" element of constructive possession constitute plain error requiring reversal and a new trial, even when there is sufficient evidence of constructive possession, if the evidence supporting the intent element is not overwhelming?
Opinions:
Majority - Baldock, Circuit Judge
Yes, the district court's failure to instruct the jury that constructive possession requires the intent to exercise control over a firearm was plain error affecting Fernando Miguel Samora's substantial rights, thereby requiring reversal and a new trial. The court first determined that the Government presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Samora constructively possessed the firearm. Although Samora only borrowed the vehicle, making it a "joint occupancy" case, the firearm was found in the readily accessible center console, Samora was the sole occupant for hours, and crucially, his DNA was the "major profile" on the gun, establishing a necessary nexus to link him to the weapon and support an inference that he handled it. However, the court found that the erroneous jury instruction omitting the "intent to exercise control" element of constructive possession constituted plain error. The error was plain because it directly contradicted established Tenth Circuit precedent, clarified by Henderson v. United States and United States v. Little, requiring both power and intent to control. The error affected Samora's substantial rights because the evidence regarding his intent to exercise control was not overwhelming or "compelling," unlike cases where such an error was deemed harmless. The court referenced United States v. Simpson and United States v. Benford, which similarly reversed convictions under plain error review when the intent element was omitted and the evidence was not overwhelming. Finally, the court concluded that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings, as it may have allowed the jury to convict Samora without requiring the government to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also rejected the Government's argument that the jury could have convicted on actual possession, finding the evidence for actual possession on the specific indictment date was weak.
Dissenting - Murphy, Circuit Judge
No, Fernando Miguel Samora has not met his burden under the third prong of the plain error test because, based on the strength of the evidence, a reasonable jury properly instructed on the intent element would have been compelled to convict him. Justice Murphy emphasized Maria Hernandez's testimony that she frequently left the firearm in the center console of her car and Samora often borrowed the vehicle for hours at a time. Coupling this with the fact that Samora's wallet was found in the driver's side door (suggesting he used the console) and his DNA was found on the weapon, the dissent argued it was a "reasonable conclusion" and "only reasonable conclusion" that Samora handled the gun while it was in the vehicle. The dissent compared the evidence to United States v. Little, where the evidence was deemed overwhelming, arguing that here, too, a reasonable jury would have found knowledge and intent to control. The dissent concluded that the evidence established Samora handled the gun while in the car and knew how to access it, thus compelling a conviction even with a correct instruction. Alternatively, if the jury disbelieved Hernandez, the only other explanation for the gun's presence would be that Samora placed it there, which would also compel conviction.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the stringency of plain error review, particularly concerning fundamental elements of a criminal offense like intent. It clarifies that even if there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, an instructional error on a core element can still be deemed to affect a defendant's substantial rights if the evidence for that specific omitted element is not overwhelmingly compelling. The ruling serves as a crucial reminder to district courts to meticulously follow established legal definitions for jury instructions, particularly for constructive possession, and highlights the high bar the government must meet when relying on ambiguous evidence of intent in such cases.
