United States v. Safavian
528 F. 3d 957, 381 U.S. App. D.C. 339, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12691 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for concealment of a material fact under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) requires the government to prove the defendant had a specific legal duty to disclose the information, which cannot be established by general employee conduct standards or the mere act of speaking to investigators. Additionally, excluding expert testimony on a specialized meaning of a term is an abuse of discretion when that meaning is central to the defendant's intent and the literal truth of their statement.
Facts:
- David Safavian, the chief of staff at the General Services Administration (GSA), was a close friend of lobbyist Jack Abramoff.
- Between May and August 2002, Abramoff sought Safavian's assistance regarding two GSA-controlled properties, the White Oak property and the Old Post Office.
- Safavian provided Abramoff with internal GSA information, reviewed Abramoff's letters to GSA, and arranged a meeting concerning one of the properties.
- In July 2002, Abramoff invited Safavian on a five-day golfing trip to Scotland, chartering a private plane for the group.
- Safavian requested a GSA ethics opinion about accepting the air transportation, stating that the host, a lobbyist, "has no business before GSA" and does "all of his work on Capitol Hill." Safavian did not disclose his assistance to Abramoff regarding the GSA properties.
- Safavian went on the trip in August 2002 after giving Abramoff a check for $3,100, an amount Abramoff suggested would cover the costs.
- In March 2003, during a GSA Office of Inspector General (GSA-OIG) investigation, Safavian told investigator Gregory Rowe that Abramoff had no business with GSA and that he had paid for the trip.
- In March 2004, Safavian reiterated in a letter to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs that Abramoff did not have any business before the GSA when the trip invitation was made.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted David Safavian on charges of concealing material facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) and obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
- The case was tried before a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- During the trial, the district court excluded expert testimony offered by the defense on the specialized meaning of the phrase "doing business."
- The jury convicted Safavian on three counts under § 1001(a)(1) and one count of obstruction of justice.
- Safavian filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied.
- The court sentenced Safavian to 18 months imprisonment, and he was released on bond pending his appeal.
- Safavian (appellant) appealed his convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, with the United States as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a government employee have a legal duty to disclose all relevant facts when seeking an ethics opinion or being interviewed by an investigator, such that failing to do so constitutes criminal concealment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1), and is it a reversible error to exclude expert testimony on the specialized meaning of a term when the defendant's intent depends on that meaning?
Opinions:
Majority - Randolph, Circuit Judge
No. A conviction for concealment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) cannot be sustained without a specific legal duty to disclose the concealed facts. The court reasoned that vague standards of conduct for government employees, such as the general principle to "disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption," do not create the specific disclosure duty required for a criminal conviction. Furthermore, the court rejected the government's argument that once a person begins speaking to investigators, they have a duty to disclose all relevant facts, stating, "We do not think § 1001 demands that individuals choose between saying everything and saying nothing." Because the government failed to identify a statute, regulation, or government form imposing a specific duty on Safavian to disclose his assistance to Abramoff, the concealment convictions were reversed. Yes. It was a reversible error for the trial court to exclude expert testimony regarding the specialized meaning of "doing business" within the government contracting industry. Safavian’s defense to the false statement charges was that his statements were literally true because, in his professional context, "doing business" meant having a formal contract with the GSA, which Abramoff did not. The expert testimony was crucial to support this defense and to help the jury determine Safavian’s intent. By excluding the testimony and deciding that the "layman's definition" was the only relevant one, the court "usurped the jury's role" and committed a harmful error that required vacating the convictions for false statements and obstruction of justice.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and narrows the scope of criminal liability for concealment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1). By requiring prosecutors to identify a specific and clear legal duty to disclose, the ruling prevents the use of vague ethical guidelines or the act of answering questions as a basis for a concealment charge, thereby strengthening due process protections. The case also reinforces the importance of admitting relevant expert testimony to establish a defendant's state of mind and the potential for multiple meanings of terms, particularly when a "literal truth" defense is asserted. This precedent makes it more difficult for the government to secure convictions for omissions and highlights the defendant's right to present evidence contextualizing their statements.
