United States v. Saboonchi
2014 WL 1364765, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47665 (2014)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under the border search doctrine, a forensic search of an electronic device, which involves creating a bitstream image and using specialized software to recover all data including deleted files, is a nonroutine search that requires reasonable suspicion.
Facts:
- In the fall of 2010, federal authorities began investigating Ali Saboonchi for potential illegal exports to Iran.
- By early March 2012, investigators obtained shipping records showing Saboonchi had shipped industrial parts (cyclone separators) to a company in the United Arab Emirates linked to an Iranian company.
- The investigation revealed Saboonchi had told the supplier the parts were for domestic use and had undervalued the items on shipping documents.
- Based on this information, law enforcement placed an alert on Saboonchi's name in the TECS border screening database.
- On March 31, 2012, Saboonchi and his wife were stopped by U.S. Custom's and Border Protection (CBP) agents at the Rainbow Bridge border crossing when returning to the U.S. from Canada.
- CBP agents seized Saboonchi’s Apple iPhone, Sony Xperia phone, and a Kingston USB flash drive.
- On April 4, 2012, a Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agent created a bitstream image of each device and conducted a forensic search using specialized software.
- The devices were returned to Saboonchi on April 13, 2012, after the forensic examination was complete.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury returned an indictment against Ali Saboonchi for unlawful export to an embargoed country and conspiracy.
- Saboonchi filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, arguing the search of his electronic devices violated the Fourth Amendment.
- The Government filed an opposition to the motion, arguing the search was a routine border search that did not require suspicion.
- The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, where two federal agents testified.
- Following the hearing, the court requested and received supplemental briefing from both parties on the issue.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a warrantless forensic search of electronic devices seized at the U.S. border violate the Fourth Amendment when performed without reasonable suspicion?
Opinions:
Majority - Paul W. Grimm
Yes, a forensic search of an electronic device seized at the border constitutes a nonroutine search and cannot be performed absent reasonable, articulable suspicion. The court distinguished between a 'conventional' border search of an electronic device—which is routine and requires no suspicion—and a 'forensic' search. A forensic search is different in kind, not just degree, because it involves creating a bitstream image of the device's entire contents, can take place long after the device has been returned, and can recover vast amounts of hidden and deleted data, revealing the most intimate details of a person's life. The court called such a search a 'body cavity search of a computer' due to its profound intrusiveness, which goes far beyond searching a physical container like a suitcase. Although a forensic search requires reasonable suspicion, the search of Saboonchi's devices was constitutional because the government's prior investigation into his shipping activities provided the necessary reasonable suspicion that the devices contained evidence of export violations.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant distinction within the Fourth Amendment's border search doctrine, creating two tiers of searches for electronic devices. By classifying a basic manual review as a 'routine' search but a 'forensic' examination as a 'nonroutine' search requiring reasonable suspicion, the court provided greater protection for digital privacy at the border than many courts had previously recognized. This decision reflects a growing judicial understanding that the vast and personal nature of data on electronic devices warrants heightened constitutional protection. It sets a precedent for analyzing the constitutionality of digital searches based on the technological methods employed, rather than treating all electronic devices as simple physical containers.
