United States v. Ronnie Lee Stewart and Rodney Fred Delegal
951 F.2d. 351 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and does not attach until formal charges are initiated for that specific offense. Furthermore, the admission of incriminating statements made to a government informant violates this right only if the informant deliberately elicited the statements, going beyond passive listening.
Facts:
- Prior to November 28, 1989, Ronnie Lee Stewart and Beacher Drell Roach conducted surveillance on a bank in Cleveland, Tennessee.
- On November 28, 1989, Stewart, Roach, Rodney Fred Delegal, and Benjamin Leavern Wells drove to Cleveland to rob the bank.
- Stewart, Delegal, and Wells entered the bank armed and in disguise, stole money, and fled while Roach waited outside.
- During their escape, a dye-pack hidden in the stolen money discharged, releasing dye and tear gas, which forced the robbers to abandon their getaway car.
- After the FBI learned of Roach's involvement, Roach agreed to surreptitiously audio-record a conversation in which Stewart implicated himself in the robbery.
- On December 8, 1989, Delegal was arrested in Kentucky on unrelated state charges for a stolen vehicle.
- On January 25, 1990, after being read his Miranda rights on two consecutive days, Delegal confessed his involvement in the federal bank robbery to an FBI agent while being held on the state charges.
- On August 5, 1990, while detained and awaiting trial on the federal robbery charges, Stewart made incriminating statements about the robbery to a fellow inmate, Roderick Stafford.
Procedural Posture:
- Ronnie Lee Stewart and Rodney Fred Delegal were indicted in U.S. District Court on federal charges of conspiracy, bank robbery, and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.
- Delegal filed a pretrial motion in the district court to suppress his confession to an FBI agent.
- The district court denied the motion to suppress.
- Following a jury trial, both Stewart and Delegal were convicted on all counts.
- The district court sentenced Stewart to 125 months and Delegal to 262 months in prison.
- Stewart and Delegal (appellants) appealed their convictions and sentences to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the admission of incriminating statements violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when (1) the statements regarding an uncharged federal crime were made after the defendant was indicted on separate state charges, and (2) other statements were made to a fellow inmate who was not acting as a government agent to deliberately elicit information?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The admission of the incriminating statements did not violate the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and does not attach until formal judicial proceedings have been initiated for that particular crime. At the time FBI Agent Brennan interrogated Delegal about the federal bank robbery, Delegal had only been indicted on unrelated state charges; therefore, his Sixth Amendment right for the federal offense had not yet attached. Furthermore, the district court found that Delegal knowingly and intelligently waived any right he may have had after receiving Miranda warnings, consistent with Patterson v. Illinois. Regarding Stewart, his Sixth Amendment right was not violated by the testimony of his fellow inmate, Stafford. Under the standard set in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, a Sixth Amendment violation occurs only when a government informant takes action 'beyond merely listening' to 'deliberately elicit' incriminating remarks. Stafford's general question about the length of Stewart's detention did not constitute deliberate elicitation; he was a passive listener, and Stewart's subsequent incriminating statements were voluntary.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces two key limitations on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. First, it affirms the 'offense-specific' nature of the right, meaning that indictment on one charge does not trigger Sixth Amendment protection for questioning about other, uncharged crimes. This provides law enforcement with a significant opportunity to investigate additional offenses even after a suspect is represented by counsel for a separate matter. Second, it solidifies the high bar for excluding testimony from jailhouse informants, requiring proof that the informant was not just a passive listener but an active agent of the state deliberately seeking a confession. This makes it more difficult for defendants to suppress damaging admissions made to fellow inmates.
