United States v. Rondeau
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 25224, 2005 WL 3116577, 430 F.3d 44 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as interpreted by Crawford v. Washington, does not apply to supervised release revocation hearings, which are not considered 'criminal prosecutions'; however, defendants in such hearings retain a limited confrontation right under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C), requiring a court to balance the releasee's right to confront witnesses against the government's good cause for denying confrontation and the reliability of the hearsay evidence.
Facts:
- Corey Rondeau pleaded guilty in May 1999 to conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine base and possession of cocaine base with the intent to distribute, resulting in a sentence of 65 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release.
- On July 17, 2004, while on supervised release, Rondeau was arrested by Worcester, Massachusetts police for committing an assault with a dangerous weapon.
- In the early morning hours of July 17th, police received two 911 calls reporting an incident at 128 Chino Street in Worcester.
- Marsha Williams, one of the callers, informed police that Rondeau had come to her apartment building looking for his girlfriend, argued with Williams, held a gun to her head, threatened to kill her, and then left in a dark-colored Ford Expedition.
- Vanessa Estrada, a thirteen-year-old girl residing in the apartment Rondeau attempted to enter, also called 911, reporting that Rondeau was holding a gun to Williams' head.
- Williams and Estrada provided handwritten statements to the police, with their accounts being materially identical.
- Minutes after the assault, police stopped a black Ford Expedition near Chino Street, occupied by Rondeau and five others, and discovered two loaded handguns inside.
- Williams later identified one of the handguns, a .25 caliber Colt, as the weapon Rondeau had pointed at her.
- Williams expressed fear for her safety about testifying, partly due to her knowledge of Rondeau's gang membership, a concern also considered applicable to the thirteen-year-old Estrada.
Procedural Posture:
- In May 1999, Corey Rondeau pleaded guilty in a federal district court to drug-related charges (conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine base and possession of cocaine base with the intent to distribute) and was sentenced to 65 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release.
- On July 17, 2004, the United States Probation Office filed a petition in the district court to revoke Rondeau's supervised release, alleging Grade A violations (assault with a dangerous weapon, illegal firearm possession) and Grade C violations (failing to participate in a drug test, failing to meet with a probation officer).
- In December 2004, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the government's motion to revoke supervised release.
- Rondeau admitted to the Grade C violations but denied the Grade A violations.
- During the hearing, the government presented hearsay evidence through Sergeant Michael McKiernan's testimony and the written statements of Marsha Williams and Vanessa Estrada.
- Rondeau objected to the admission of this hearsay evidence, arguing it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and his rights under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).
- The district court overruled Rondeau's objection, admitted the hearsay evidence, and found by a preponderance of the evidence that Rondeau had committed an assault with a deadly weapon and was a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm.
- The district court revoked Rondeau's supervised release and imposed an additional twenty-four months of incarceration.
- Rondeau appealed the district court's final judgment revoking his supervised release to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, where he was the appellant and the United States of America was the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, apply to supervised release revocation hearings, and did the district court abuse its discretion in admitting hearsay evidence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) when good cause for the witnesses' absence and the reliability of their statements were established?
Opinions:
Majority - Howard, Circuit Judge
No, the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, does not apply to supervised release revocation hearings, and no, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C). The court affirmed that the Confrontation Clause, which guarantees the right to confront adverse witnesses "[i]n criminal prosecutions," does not extend to supervised release revocation hearings. The Supreme Court established in Morrissey v. Brewer that parole (and by extension, supervised release) revocation hearings are not "criminal prosecutions," thus the "full panoply of rights" due a criminal defendant does not apply. Crawford did not indicate an intent to broaden the Confrontation Clause's scope beyond the criminal prosecution context. However, defendants in supervised release revocation proceedings do possess a limited confrontation right under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C), which permits questioning of adverse witnesses "unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear." This rule necessitates a balancing test, weighing the releasee's confrontation right against the government's good cause for denying confrontation, with key factors being the reliability of the hearsay and the government's reason for not producing the declarant. The district court was within its discretion in finding the hearsay evidence reliable because: (1) Williams' and Estrada's 911 calls qualified as excited utterances; (2) their separate accounts were materially identical; (3) their statements were reduced to writing; (4) Williams consistently maintained her account; and (5) police corroborated the statements by locating Rondeau and the identified gun near the scene. Furthermore, the government provided sufficient good cause for not presenting live testimony, citing Williams' expressed fear for her safety due to Rondeau's gang membership, a concern equally applicable to the thirteen-year-old Estrada. The court concluded that, given the reliability of the evidence and the valid reason for the declarants' absence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, firmly establishing that it does not apply to post-conviction proceedings like supervised release revocation hearings. This distinction allows courts greater flexibility in admitting evidence in revocation hearings compared to criminal trials, streamlining the process while still upholding due process rights. The ruling reinforces a balancing test under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C), providing a framework for courts to assess the reliability of hearsay evidence and the government's justification for a witness's absence, particularly when safety concerns are present. This approach balances the public interest in efficient revocation proceedings and witness protection against the releasee's limited right to challenge adverse testimony.
