United States v. Ronald Berry Washington
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22710, 2004 WL 2435487, 387 F.3d 1060 (2004)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Evidence obtained through a search is inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule if the consent to search was tainted by prior unconstitutional police conduct, even if the consent was otherwise voluntary.
Facts:
- On February 25, 2001, Reno Police Department (RPD) officers received an anonymous tip about a methamphetamine lab in Room 319 of the Comstock Hotel and that occupants of an unidentified fifteenth-floor room were involved in manufacturing or distributing methamphetamine.
- RPD Officer Tygard learned from the Comstock desk clerk that Room 319 was vacant and that Room 1524, occupied by Ronald Berry Washington, received many calls and had heavy foot traffic on the fifteenth floor.
- Officer Tygard learned Washington had prior convictions for unlawful use of a controlled substance, carrying a concealed weapon, obstructing police, and giving false information.
- At approximately 8:30 p.m., six RPD officers went to Washington's Room 1524 to conduct a “knock and talk” because they suspected him of drug involvement, though they had no probable cause for a search warrant.
- Washington opened the door, exited his room, and closed the door behind him, at which point he saw all six officers, five of whom carried visible firearms and surrounded him.
- Officer Sceirine reminded Washington that he had been arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and had not registered with the RPD, which was an “arrestable charge,” and Washington complied with a pat-down search for weapons that yielded nothing.
- The officers moved Washington twenty to thirty feet down the hallway away from his door, and when Sergeant Partyka realized someone else was in Washington’s room, Officer Sceirine called for Leo “Libo” Nolan to exit.
- Nolan exited, leaving the door open, and when Washington asked Nolan to close the door, Officers Soto and Sceirine refused, stating they “d[id not] like leaving this door closed,” which gave them an “ample view of the room.”
- Officer Sceirine again reminded Washington of his failure to register, an “arrestable charge,” and questioned him about a methamphetamine lab, which Washington emphatically denied.
- Sceirine asked Washington to cooperate and consent to a search, to which Washington responded, “Uh, sure,” but the district court later found this was not consent.
- Sceirine again suggested they “go inside and talk,” and Washington asked if his wife could arrive first, but almost immediately Sceirine pointed into the room and asked, “Is that a gun on the bed?”, to which Washington responded, “No sir.... That’s a pager.”
- Sceirine then said, “OK, well let[’]s go,” and Washington responded, “OK,” which the district court also found was not consent, meaning the officers entered Washington's room unconstitutionally.
- Inside the room, Detective Chittenden questioned Washington, who admitted to possessing a line of methamphetamine and indicated its general location; an officer then moved Washington’s coat and discovered the methamphetamine line.
- Officer Sceirine presented a permission to search form, urging Washington to sign to avoid a lengthy investigation, but Washington initially refused, stating, “I don’t have anything here, you can see that.”
- Sceirine again requested Washington sign, saying, “So can we get your permission to search here? Just sign right here, this is your name right here. All this is, is a permission to search nothing else,” and Washington then signed the form.
- During the ensuing search, Detective Chittenden discovered a handgun, which Washington confessed to owning.
Procedural Posture:
- Washington was charged in a one-count indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- Washington filed a motion to suppress the handgun and his confession, arguing they were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
- The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Washington's motion to suppress.
- The district court denied Washington's motion, concluding that while his initial verbal consents were invalid and the officers' entry into his room unconstitutional, his later written consent was voluntary and purged any taint from prior constitutional violations.
- Washington entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a defendant's written consent to search, obtained minutes after multiple Fourth Amendment violations (including an unconstitutional seizure, visual search, entry, and physical search of his residential hotel room), sufficiently purge the taint of the prior illegal conduct to render evidence discovered during the search admissible?
Opinions:
Majority - Pregerson
Yes, Washington's written consent to search his room, and the evidence obtained pursuant to it, were tainted by the officers' repeated violations of his Fourth Amendment rights and therefore should have been suppressed. The court applied the three-factor attenuation test from Brown v. Illinois to determine if the taint of prior illegal conduct was purged: (1) temporal proximity between the illegality and consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. First, Washington was unconstitutionally seized when confronted by six officers, five of whom displayed visible weapons, in the semi-private hallway of his residence. His liberty was restricted given the number of officers, display of force, private setting, officers' authoritative manner (repeatedly reminding him of an 'arrestable charge' as a coercive tactic), and failure to advise him of his right to terminate the encounter. This detention exceeded a permissible Terry-stop because it was neither brief nor minimally intrusive; the officers continued questioning and attempting to gain entry after a pat-down yielded no weapons and Washington denied wrongdoing. The officers' actions were calculated to circumvent the warrant requirement for a home search. Second, the officers conducted an unconstitutional visual search when they refused Washington's request to close his door, thereby gaining an 'ample view' of his room without consent, a warrant, or probable cause plus exigent circumstances. Third, the officers’ entry into Washington's room was unconstitutional because the district court found, and the government did not challenge, that Washington's verbal responses were not valid consent. Fourth, the officers conducted an unconstitutional physical search by moving Washington's coat to find methamphetamine after he admitted its general location but before obtaining valid consent to search that area. Moving the coat constituted a search requiring probable cause for the thing being moved, which the officers lacked. Applying the Brown factors to the written consent: (1) Temporal Proximity: Only approximately fifteen minutes separated the initial unconstitutional seizure and Washington's signing of the consent form, and even less time separated the other violations, which is insufficient to purge the taint. (2) Intervening Circumstances: Washington signing a form that advised him of his right to refuse consent was not a significant intervening circumstance. Unlike being released from custody, appearing before a magistrate, or consulting an attorney, it did not distance him from the coercive effects of the prior violations. The court rejected the government's argument that such advice alone purges the taint, noting it would undermine the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose. (3) Purpose and Flagrancy: The officers' misconduct was purposeful and flagrant. They lacked probable cause but repeatedly tried to gain access to Washington's room, used the threat of arrest for a minor charge as a coercive tactic, and then exploited the illegally discovered methamphetamine to pressure Washington into signing the consent form. This conduct was an investigatory expedition designed to detect criminal evidence without a warrant, demonstrating a lack of good faith. Thus, all three factors weigh in favor of suppression.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the protections of the Fourth Amendment, particularly concerning searches within a person's home. It clarifies that even ostensibly voluntary consent can be invalidated if it is the product of prior unconstitutional police actions, emphasizing that a mere advisement of rights on a consent form is insufficient to purge the taint of serious and repeated Fourth Amendment violations. The ruling underscores the judiciary's commitment to deterring police misconduct and preventing officers from exploiting illegal acts to secure evidence, serving as a critical check on "knock and talk" tactics that morph into de facto arrests or warrantless searches without probable cause or exigency. It provides a strong precedent for suppressing evidence where the police's actions demonstrate a purposeful attempt to circumvent constitutional safeguards.
