United States v. Roland Demingo Queen, A/K/A Mingo
48 Fed. R. Serv. 599, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36283, 132 F.3d 991 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits the admission of prior bad acts evidence to prove a defendant's intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake, provided the evidence is relevant, necessary, reliable, and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, and accompanied by proper safeguards.
Facts:
- Roland D. Queen was charged with conspiring to tamper with a witness and tampering with a witness.
- The indictment alleged that from February 1994 to March 1995, Queen illegally attempted to dissuade a witness named Feronica Isaacs from testifying in the drug trafficking trial of Stephen Hester and others.
- Before Queen’s 1986 trial for armed robbery, Queen threatened a witness, stating he would shoot him if he testified against Queen.
- Before Queen’s 1986 trial, Queen threatened another witness, stating he would “deal with” him for alerting authorities to Queen’s involvement in the armed robbery.
- Queen engaged in a conspiracy with Stephen Hester to tamper with witnesses before and during Hester’s trial.
- Queen made menacing glares towards witnesses testifying against Hester on the witness stand.
- Queen met with Feronica Isaacs on her doorstep, where he allegedly threatened her, telling her it would be in her best interest not to testify against Hester, and attempted to bribe her not to testify.
- Queen admitted visiting Isaacs and speaking with her, but denied threatening or bribing her, maintaining he only suggested she visit Hester’s attorney.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Roland D. Queen with conspiring to tamper with a witness and with tampering with a witness.
- Before trial, the government notified Queen that it intended to introduce evidence that he had tampered with witnesses in 1986.
- Queen filed a motion in limine to exclude that evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403.
- At a pretrial hearing, the district court denied Queen's motion in limine, ruling the prior acts admissible under Rule 404(b) to show intent and not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.
- At trial, the government introduced evidence of Queen’s prior acts of witness tampering.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts charged.
- The district court sentenced Queen to 174 months imprisonment, adjusting his offense level upward by two levels for perjury committed during trial.
- Queen appealed his conviction and sentence.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) permit the admission of a defendant's prior acts of witness tampering to prove intent in a later, separate prosecution for witness tampering, even if the defendant offers a conditional stipulation regarding intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Niemeyer, Circuit Judge
Yes, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits the admission of a defendant's prior acts of witness tampering to prove intent in a later, separate prosecution for witness tampering, especially when the prior acts are highly similar and the court provides limiting instructions. The court affirmed the district court's admission of Queen's 1986 witness tampering evidence, finding it relevant to prove intent, which is an essential element of the charged crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, allowing prior bad acts for purposes other than proving character, such as intent. The prior acts were highly similar in nature (witness tampering) to the charged conduct, which, under the "doctrine of chances," increases their relevance to negate an innocent intent. The court applied its four-prong test for admissibility: (1) relevance to an issue other than character (intent), (2) necessity (probative of an essential element), (3) reliability, and (4) probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice under Rule 403. The nine-year gap between the prior acts and the current charge did not render the evidence irrelevant, particularly as Queen spent many of those intervening years in prison. The government was not required to accept Queen's conditional stipulation to the intent element, as it bears the burden of proving every element of the crime charged and must have the freedom to decide how to discharge that burden. The district court provided a limiting instruction, which mitigated the risk of the jury improperly using the evidence to infer bad character. Advance notice to the defense further addressed concerns of "trial by ambush." The court found the evidence necessary because the government's case for intent largely rested on the testimony of Feronica Isaacs and one other witness. The reliability of the prior act witnesses was affirmed despite their plea agreements, as the risk of a perjury charge makes false testimony unlikely. Finally, the court concluded that the evidence's probative value was high, and while inherently prejudicial, it was not unduly so under Rule 403 because it did not subordinate reason to emotion. The court also rejected Queen's other arguments concerning jury instructions on the conspiracy timeline and the perjury sentencing enhancement, finding no reversible error.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial clarification for the Fourth Circuit's application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), particularly regarding the admissibility of prior bad acts to prove intent. It reinforces that 404(b) is a rule of inclusion and establishes a refined framework for trial courts to evaluate such evidence, emphasizing the importance of similarity between prior and charged acts, the necessity of the evidence to prove an essential element, and the careful balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice. The ruling also clarifies that the prosecution is not obligated to accept a defendant's conditional stipulation to an element like intent, preserving its right to present compelling evidence. This decision strengthens the prosecution's ability to introduce such evidence while guiding trial courts to implement safeguards like limiting instructions and advance notice to mitigate risks of unfair prejudice or confusion.
