United States v. Roberto Leal-Cruz
431 F.3d 667, 2005 WL 3338292, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 26908 (2005)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause is not violated when the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of duress is placed on the defendant, so long as the defense serves to excuse the criminal conduct rather than negate a required element of the charged offense.
Facts:
- Roberto Leal-Cruz is a citizen of Mexico.
- Approximately two weeks before his arrest, Mexican police officers beat Leal-Cruz and left him for dead.
- On July 12, 2003, while pumping gas in Mexico, Leal-Cruz was spotted by the same police officers who had previously assaulted him.
- Fearing for his life, Leal-Cruz ran approximately three blocks to the international boundary fence separating Mexico and the United States.
- He climbed over the fence into Calexico, California to escape the pursuing Mexican police officers.
- After seeing U.S. border patrol agents, he initially sat on top of the fence, but when the Mexican police appeared, he jumped down onto the American side.
- A U.S. border patrol agent chased Leal-Cruz for two blocks before he surrendered.
Procedural Posture:
- Roberto Leal-Cruz was tried in U.S. District Court for attempted illegal reentry into the United States after deportation.
- At trial, Leal-Cruz asserted the defense of duress.
- The district court judge instructed the jury that Leal-Cruz had the burden to prove his duress defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
- A jury found Leal-Cruz guilty of the offense.
- Leal-Cruz appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the constitutionality of the jury instruction.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a jury instruction that places the burden on a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence violate the Due Process Clause when the crime charged is attempted illegal reentry, a specific intent offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Callahan, Circuit Judge
No. A jury instruction placing the burden of proving duress on the defendant does not violate the Due Process Clause because the defense of duress does not negate the specific intent element of attempted illegal reentry. The court reasoned that the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in cases like Patterson v. New York, only forbids shifting the burden of proof to a defendant if the defense would necessarily negate an element the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. For the specific intent crime of attempted illegal reentry, the required mens rea is the 'purpose' or 'conscious desire' to reenter the United States. The court found that Leal-Cruz's reason for crossing the border—to escape harm—did not negate his 'conscious desire' to enter the country; rather, it provided a potential excuse for his conduct. Citing precedents like United States v. Hernandez-Franco, the court concluded that a person can act with specific intent to commit a crime (e.g., entering the U.S.) while simultaneously being motivated by duress, meaning the defense does not cancel out the element of intent. Therefore, the burden of proving the excuse of duress could constitutionally be placed on the defendant.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that an affirmative defense's burden of proof can be allocated to the defendant as long as the defense does not negate an essential element of the crime. It clarifies that for specific intent crimes, the defendant's motive (e.g., fear or coercion) is legally distinct from their intent (the conscious object to perform the prohibited act). The ruling provides a clear precedent for lower courts, distinguishing between defenses that attack the prosecution's prima facie case and those that offer an independent reason for excuse or justification. This reinforces the legislature's ability to define crimes and defenses without running afoul of due process, provided the government always retains the burden of proving every element of the offense itself.
