United States v. Robert Turner, United States of America v. Guinn Kelly
130 F.3d 815 (1998)
Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause, as interpreted by the Blockburger "same-elements" test, generally does not bar subsequent prosecution under a superseding indictment after an improperly declared mistrial, even if based on the same factual predicate, unless the offenses are identical in elements or for the same specific individual act.
Facts:
- Robert Turner and Guinn Kelly were alleged to have submitted false time cards showing more hours than they actually worked at a federal public housing project.
- These allegations covered pay periods from April 1993 through March 1994.
- Each alleged instance of false time card submission related to a different pay period.
- The actions involved both stealing money from a federal agency (18 U.S.C. § 641) and making materially false statements to a federal agency (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)).
- There were also allegations involving conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371).
- A third individual, Kenneth Givens, was involved in similar allegations, and his lawyer might have had to testify as a witness.
Procedural Posture:
- In January 1995, Robert Turner and Guinn Kelly were indicted on various charges related to submitting false time cards.
- In February 1995, a superseding indictment (SI) was returned against Mr. Turner, Mr. Kelly, and Kenneth Givens.
- On the fourth day of trial, the trial court declared a mistrial for all three defendants, over the objections of Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly, due to a potential conflict with Mr. Givens's attorney needing to testify.
- The trial court subsequently denied motions by Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly to dismiss the indictment.
- Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly appealed the trial court’s denial of their motions to dismiss to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
- The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Givens, 88 F.3d 608 (8th Cir.1996), held that no "manifest necessity" existed for declaring a mistrial with respect to Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly, and remanded their cases for further proceedings.
- Approximately four months later, the government returned another superseding indictment (S4) against only Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly.
- Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly moved to dismiss S4 on the grounds of double jeopardy and res judicata.
- A magistrate judge recommended that the motions be denied, and the trial court adopted these recommendations, denying the motions to dismiss.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar the government from prosecuting defendants under a superseding indictment, filed after an improperly declared mistrial, when the new charges (1) involve different pay periods, (2) involve the same pay periods but shift between offenses requiring different elements (e.g., stealing money from a federal agency vs. making materially false statements to a federal agency), or (3) involve aiding and abetting charges for a third person's actions, even if based on the same general factual allegations of submitting false time cards?
Opinions:
Majority - Morris Sheppard Arnold
No, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally does not bar the government from prosecuting Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly under the superseding indictment (S4) for most of the specified charges, with the exception of one identical count against Mr. Kelly. This is because the various charges involve either distinct individual acts, different elements under the Blockburger test, or actions related to a third party not previously charged. First, regarding counts related to pay periods not included in the prior indictment (SI), the court held that when a statute targets individual acts rather than a course of conduct, offenses charged with respect to separate dates, even if of the same nature, are not the "same" offense for double jeopardy purposes. Therefore, the government is not barred from prosecuting Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly on charges for new pay periods in S4. Second, concerning counts where the charge for a specific pay period shifted between 18 U.S.C. § 641 (stealing money) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (making false statements), the court applied the "same-elements test" from United States v. Dixon, which overruled Grady v. Corbin. This test determines if each offense contains an element not contained in the other. As charged, § 641 requires proof of the theft of more than $100, which is not required for § 1001(a). Conversely, § 1001(a) requires proof of a materially false statement, which is not required for § 641. Since each statute requires proof of a different element, they are not the "same" offense, and double jeopardy does not bar prosecution on these shifted charges. Third, regarding the aiding-and-abetting charges in S4, the court found they were not barred. The prior indictment (SI) charged Mr. Turner and Mr. Kelly with offenses related to their own false time cards. The S4 aiding-and-abetting charges are based on their involvement in the submission of false time cards by a third person. Since SI contained no charges concerning acts by Mr. Turner or Mr. Kelly related to any third person's time cards, these new charges are not the "same" offense. Fourth, the court found one exception: count 5 in S4 against Mr. Kelly was identical to count 18 in SI. For this single charge, the double jeopardy clause does bar prosecution. Finally, the court rejected the arguments based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata in criminal proceedings applies to matters determined by a "verdict"; since there was only a mistrial, this doctrine is inapplicable. Collateral estoppel, a component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, requires an "issue of ultimate fact" to have been determined by a "valid and final judgment." The record lacked any determination of whether the time cards at issue in the first trial were false, rendering collateral estoppel inapplicable.
Analysis:
This case is significant for reinforcing the Supreme Court's United States v. Dixon ruling, which firmly re-established the Blockburger "same-elements" test as the primary double jeopardy standard for distinct statutory offenses, explicitly discarding the 'same conduct' test of Grady v. Corbin. It clarifies that even after an improperly declared mistrial, the government largely retains the ability to pursue new or different charges based on the same underlying factual scheme, provided the charges either involve separate individual acts or distinct statutory elements. The limited application of double jeopardy in this context emphasizes that a mistrial, unlike an acquittal, typically does not preclude re-prosecution unless the subsequent charges are identical to those where jeopardy attached, or if an ultimate fact essential to both charges was definitively determined.
