United States v. Robert Sarantos and Constantine Makris
455 F.2d 877, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11480 (1972)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For a criminal statute requiring 'knowingly' making false statements, knowledge can be established by a defendant acting with reckless disregard for the truth or with a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth. In a conspiracy, the scope of the agreement defines its duration, and a co-conspirator is accountable for overt acts in furtherance of the principal objective, even if they were unaware of every specific step.
Facts:
- Robert Sarantos, an attorney, and Constantine Makris participated in illegal plans to obtain permanent residence in the United States for male Greek aliens.
- The scheme involved arranging sham marriages between Greek aliens and Puerto Rican women who were United States citizens, followed by the preparation of false visa petitions stating the couples were living together.
- Makris acted as a marriage broker, locating Puerto Rican women and helping to arrange sham marriages for a fee.
- Sarantos handled the second stage, where wives would sign blank visa petitions in his office; he would then complete and file these with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), falsely stating the couples were living together.
- Sarantos was aware of numerous indications that the marriages were shams, such as couples lacking a common language, simultaneous execution of divorce papers, knowledge of wives being paid, and indirect information that couples were not living together.
- For one specific conspiracy (Count 3), Makris in January 1964 arranged for Sylvia Cohen to find a Puerto Rican woman, Luz Rodriquez, to marry Panagiotis Sassalos.
- Luz Rodriquez and Panagiotis Sassalos were married on January 14, 1964, and on the same day, Luz signed a blank visa petition at Sarantos's office, which Sarantos completed and filed with the INS, falsely stating they lived together.
- In August 1964, Sassalos appeared before the INS and again falsely stated he and Luz were living together, subsequently receiving a permanent residence visa on August 27, 1964.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Sarantos and Constantine Makris were indicted on multiple counts related to conspiring to make false statements to the INS and aiding and abetting the making of false statements.
- Before the case was submitted to the jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Judge Wyatt withdrew Count 11 (a substantive count against Sarantos) and Count 12 (a conspiracy count, as applied to Makris).
- A jury found Sarantos guilty on five conspiracy counts and seven aiding and abetting counts, and Makris guilty on two conspiracy counts, but acquitted both on Count 1.
- Sarantos's attorney objected to the trial court's jury instruction regarding the definition of 'knowledge' for aiding and abetting, specifically challenging the inclusion of 'reckless disregard' or 'conscious effort to avoid learning the truth,' but the trial court overruled the objection.
- Makris's attorney unsuccessfully requested the trial judge to instruct the jury on the defenses of the statute of limitations and the existence of two conspiracies with regard to Count 3.
- Sarantos and Makris appealed their judgments of conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, challenging various portions of the trial court's charge to the jury.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a jury instruction defining 'knowingly' for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to include 'reckless disregard of whether the statements made were true or with a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth' proper; and can a co-conspirator be held accountable for overt acts furthering the conspiracy's principal objective, even if they were not aware of every specific step involved?
Opinions:
Majority - Feinberg, Circuit Judge
Yes, the jury instruction defining 'knowingly' to include reckless disregard for the truth or a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth is proper, and yes, a co-conspirator can be held accountable for overt acts furthering the conspiracy's principal objective, even if unaware of every specific step. The court affirms the trial court's jury instruction on 'knowledge' for 18 U.S.C. § 1001, citing United States v. Egenberg (1971) and United States v. Abrams (1970). The court states that Abrams aimed to prevent individuals from circumventing criminal sanctions by 'deliberately closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct,' noting that 'wilful blindness' is a recognized concept in law (Leary v. United States, United States v. Squires). The court clarifies that this standard does not obligate attorneys to investigate clients' assertions but prohibits them from counseling false statements in the face of 'obvious indications of which he is aware that those assertions are not true.' The court also found no reversible error in the trial court's use of 'or' instead of 'and' in the instruction regarding 'reckless disregard' or 'conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth,' considering the phrases 'essentially the same thing' and any difference harmless, though it recommends 'and' for future charges. Regarding Makris, the court affirms the denial of a statute of limitations instruction because the principal objective of the conspiracy (obtaining permanent residence for Sassalos) had not been secured by the relevant date. Sassalos's August 1964 false statement to the INS was an overt act within the scope and furtherance of the original agreement. The court emphasizes that Makris is accountable because he knew and assented to the conspiracy's objectives, regardless of his familiarity with every specific step taken by co-conspirators to achieve them (Grunewald v. United States, United States v. Cobb). The court also found no evidence to support a jury instruction on a 'two conspiracies' defense concerning Count 3, as there was no basis to infer a separate conspiracy for citizenship for Sassalos.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the doctrine of willful blindness, extending criminal liability for 'knowing' conduct to situations where defendants, including professionals like attorneys, deliberately ignore obvious indications of unlawful activity. It clarifies that attorneys are not mandated to investigate every client assertion but are prohibited from facilitating false statements when aware of clear signs of untruth. Furthermore, the decision provides important guidance on the expansive nature of conspiracy liability, establishing that co-conspirators are bound by the full scope of the agreement's objectives and accountable for all acts in furtherance thereof, even if they lacked knowledge of every specific operational detail. This interpretation is crucial for prosecuting complex criminal schemes where participants may claim ignorance of specific downstream actions.
