United States v. Robel
389 U.S. 258 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
A statute that criminalizes employment for all members of a designated political group, regardless of the individual's degree of activity, knowledge of the group's unlawful aims, or the sensitivity of their position, is an unconstitutionally overbroad infringement on the First Amendment's freedom of association.
Facts:
- The Subversive Activities Control Board issued a final order requiring the Communist Party of the United States to register as a Communist-action organization, which became effective on October 20, 1961.
- At that time, Robel was a member of the Communist Party.
- Robel was employed as a machinist at the Todd Shipyards Corporation in Seattle, Washington.
- On August 20, 1962, the Secretary of Defense designated the Todd Shipyards as a 'defense facility' under the Subversive Activities Control Act.
- Robel continued his employment at the shipyard after this designation, making him subject to prosecution under the Act.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government filed an indictment against Robel in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, charging him with violating § 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act.
- Robel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds.
- The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, construing the statute to require 'active membership and specific intent,' which the indictment failed to allege.
- The Government, insisting on the broadest application of the statute, appealed the dismissal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does § 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which makes it unlawful for any member of a registered Communist-action organization to work in a defense facility, violate the First Amendment's freedom of association?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Warren
Yes, § 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act is an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association protected by the First Amendment. The statute is fatally overbroad because it indiscriminately criminalizes association without regard to the quality and degree of an individual's membership. It fails to distinguish between active members with unlawful intent and passive members who may be unaware of or disagree with the organization's unlawful aims. The statute establishes guilt by association alone, making it irrelevant whether an individual occupies a sensitive position or poses any actual threat to national security. While the government has a substantial interest in preventing sabotage, it must achieve this goal through means that are less drastic and more narrowly tailored to avoid infringing on protected First Amendment freedoms.
Dissenting - Justice White
No, the statute does not violate the First Amendment and is a constitutional exercise of congressional power to protect national security. The right of association is not absolute and must be accommodated with the substantial public interest in security. Congress and the Executive Branch are better positioned than the judiciary to assess threats to the nation, and the Court should defer to their judgment. The statute is a suitable precautionary measure to prevent espionage and sabotage, as it is difficult to identify which members of a subversive organization pose a threat in advance. The burden on associational rights is minimal, as it only bars employment in a small percentage of critical defense industries, and this interest is less substantial than the public interest in national security.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Yes, the statute is unconstitutional, but the primary flaw is not overbreadth but an impermissible delegation of legislative power. Congress granted the Secretary of Defense untrammeled discretion to designate 'defense facilities' without providing any meaningful standards to guide that determination. This lack of standards creates a danger of arbitrary and overbroad application of criminal sanctions in an area affecting fundamental First Amendment rights. When regulating in such a sensitive area, Congress must make an explicit legislative judgment with clear, manageable standards, which it failed to do here. The statute is therefore invalid because it delegates policy-making functions to an executive officer without sufficient guidance.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the application of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine to the freedom of association. By striking down a statute based on national security concerns, the Court affirmed that even compelling government interests do not justify legislative means that sweep so broadly as to punish constitutionally protected association. The decision reinforces the principle that guilt must be personal, not by association, and requires Congress to use narrowly tailored, 'less drastic means' when its regulations impact fundamental rights. This precedent makes it significantly more difficult for the government to restrict employment or other benefits based solely on an individual's membership in a disfavored political group.
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