United States v. Riley D. Funches
1996 WL 266558, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11660, 84 F.3d 249 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
An in-court identification is admissible, even if it follows an unduly suggestive out-of-court identification procedure, as long as the identification is independently reliable under the totality of the circumstances.
Facts:
- On August 30, 1993, a man robbed the Equitable Bank. Bank teller Cherita Graham observed the robber's facial features during the incident.
- Four days later, Graham viewed a police lineup that did not include Riley D. Funches and did not identify anyone as the robber.
- On September 7, 1993, a man wearing a surgical mask and an LSU baseball cap robbed the Bank One. Teller Jacqueline Haley saw the man's face clearly before he put on the mask.
- Minutes later, off-duty officer Sergeant John Hogan saw a man in an LSU cap picking up money off the street near the bank.
- Police found Funches's identification card in a hotel room along with an LSU cap and clothing matching the robber's description.
- Police arrested Funches and his girlfriend, Angenell Fulton, who was carrying over $6,000 in cash, including $500 in recorded 'bait money' from Bank One.
- Approximately four hours after the Bank One robbery, police brought Funches alone to the bank for a 'show-up,' where Haley identified him as the robber.
- The next day, Graham and Hogan independently identified Funches in a five-person police lineup as the man they had seen.
Procedural Posture:
- Riley D. Funches moved to suppress the identification testimony of teller Cherita Graham in the U.S. District Court, arguing the lineup was unduly suggestive.
- The district court, as the court of first instance, denied the motion to suppress.
- A jury in the district court convicted Funches on two counts of bank robbery.
- Funches (appellant) appealed the conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing the trial court erred by admitting identification testimony from both robberies. The United States was the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the admission of in-court eyewitness identifications violate a defendant's due process rights when those identifications followed allegedly suggestive out-of-court procedures, specifically a police lineup and a one-person show-up?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Flaum
No, the admission of the identifications did not violate the defendant's due process rights. An identification following a potentially suggestive procedure is admissible if it is nevertheless reliable, and here, both identifications were sufficiently reliable. The court applies a two-step inquiry: first, whether the identification procedure was unreasonably suggestive, and second, if so, whether the identification is reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Regarding the lineup for the Equitable Bank robbery, the court found the physical differences between Funches and the other participants were 'insignificant' and within a reasonable range of similarity, so the procedure was not unduly suggestive. Regarding the show-up for the Bank One robbery, the court acknowledged that show-ups are 'inherently suggestive' and that this one was arguably 'impermissibly suggestive.' However, it found Haley's identification was nonetheless reliable under the five factors established in Neil v. Biggers: (1) Haley had a clear opportunity to view the robber's face; (2) her attention was drawn to him; (3) her prior description was very accurate; (4) she was certain in her identification; and (5) only a few hours had passed between the crime and the confrontation. Furthermore, even if admitting the show-up identification was an error, it did not constitute a 'miscarriage of justice' given the overwhelming independent evidence of Funches's guilt.
Analysis:
This case provides a clear application of the two-part test for the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence established by the Supreme Court. It demonstrates that even a 'widely condemned' and inherently suggestive procedure like a show-up will not automatically lead to suppression of the identification. The court's analysis emphasizes that reliability is the 'linchpin,' and a strong showing on the five reliability factors can overcome the taint of a suggestive procedure. The decision also highlights the high bar for reversal under the 'plain error' standard, where overwhelming corroborating evidence can render any error in admitting testimony harmless.
