United States v. Rico Williams
836 F.3d 1, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16247 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A victim's consenting behavior, while not an affirmative defense to homicide, is relevant evidence that a jury must be permitted to consider when determining whether a defendant possessed the requisite mental state (malice aforethought) for a second-degree murder conviction. A prosecutor's misstatement of law telling the jury it cannot consider such evidence constitutes a prejudicial error requiring reversal, especially when the case is close on the mental state issue and the trial court's instructions do not sufficiently cure the error.
Facts:
- Rico Williams was the leader of a group called 'Brothers of the Struggle' (BOS) near Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany, composed of U.S. military members.
- The BOS initiated new members through a violent ritual called a 'jump-in,' a six-minute beating by about six members, which had been performed 15-18 times previously without causing hospitalization or death.
- On July 3, 2005, Army Sergeant Juwan Johnson voluntarily participated in a jump-in to join the BOS.
- Johnson's jump-in was more violent than usual, involving more participants (nine), lasting longer than six minutes, and including kicking, which had not occurred in prior initiations.
- Throughout the beating, when asked if he wanted to proceed, Johnson consistently and enthusiastically responded with affirmations like 'Hell yeah.'
- After the beating, Johnson was exhausted, slurring his speech, and later asked to be taken to a hospital.
- Another BOS member relayed Johnson's request to Williams, who directed that Johnson not be taken to the hospital.
- Johnson was found dead the following morning from blunt force injuries sustained during the beating.
Procedural Posture:
- Rico Williams was charged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia with second-degree murder and witness tampering under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.
- Following a trial, a jury found Williams guilty of second-degree murder and one count of witness tampering.
- Williams filed post-trial motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and prejudicial prosecutorial error during closing arguments.
- The district court (trial court) denied Williams's motions.
- Williams, as appellant, appealed his convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, with the United States as appellee.
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Issue:
Does a prosecutor's incorrect statement during closing argument, which tells the jury it cannot consider the victim's consenting behavior when determining the defendant's mental state for murder, substantially prejudice the defendant's trial and warrant reversal of the conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Griffith, Circuit Judge
Yes, the prosecutor's misstatement substantially prejudiced the defendant's trial, requiring reversal of the murder conviction. The government misstated the law by inaccurately conflating two distinct legal concepts: consent as an affirmative defense, which is not available for homicide, and the victim's consenting behavior as evidence relevant to the defendant's state of mind. Johnson's repeated enthusiastic affirmations that he wanted the beating to continue were crucial evidence for the jury to consider when determining whether Williams acted with malice aforethought—a conscious disregard of an extreme risk (required for murder)—or whether he merely should have been aware of the risk (required for manslaughter). The error was severe as it affected the central and close issue of Williams's mental state, and the district court's general jury instructions were insufficient to cure the specific confusion created by the prosecutor's incorrect statement.
Concurring - Kavanaugh, Circuit Judge
Yes, the prosecutor's misstatement warrants reversal of the murder conviction. The case presented a close call between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, with the defendant's mens rea being the critical distinguishing element. The victim's statements during the initiation were the key evidence for the jury to assess that mental state. The prosecutor incorrectly told the jury they could not consider this evidence, and the court's final instructions failed to correct this fundamental legal misunderstanding, thereby tainting the verdict on the murder charge.
Dissenting - Henderson, Circuit Judge
No, the prosecutor's statement was not a misstatement of law and did not cause substantial prejudice. The prosecutor correctly argued that Johnson's subjective 'consent' was irrelevant to Williams's state of mind; she never told the jury it could not consider Johnson's objective behavior or words. Even if the statement were erroneous, any potential prejudice was cured by the district court's thorough and correct jury instructions, which directed the jury to consider all evidence and follow the law as given by the court, not the lawyers. Furthermore, the evidence of malice was overwhelming, given the unusual brutality of the beating and Williams's subsequent depraved refusal of Johnson's request for medical attention, making this a straightforward case of murder, not a close call.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the critical distinction in criminal law between an affirmative defense and evidence used to negate an element of a crime. The court clarifies that while consent is never a justification for homicide, a victim's overt behaviors and statements indicating consent are highly relevant evidence for a jury to consider when evaluating a defendant's subjective mental state (mens rea). The ruling establishes that a prosecutor's argument conflating these concepts can constitute reversible error, particularly if not specifically corrected by the trial judge. This precedent will guide prosecutors to be more precise in closing arguments and compel trial courts to craft more specific curative instructions in cases involving consensual but dangerous activities that result in death.
