United States v. Ricardo Murillo
2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3579, 288 F.3d 1126, 59 Fed. R. Serv. 23 (2002)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A trial delay attributed to the government’s death penalty evaluation process or the complexity of a case, even when initially opposed by the defendant, does not violate Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights or the Speedy Trial Act if the court properly articulates “ends of justice” reasons. A prosecutor's peremptory strike of a juror, based on objectively verifiable, race-neutral reasons such as perceived communication difficulties, does not constitute purposeful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky.
Facts:
- In summer 1998, Christopher Moseley, a Delaware resident, sent his stepson, Dean MacGuigan, to Las Vegas to establish residency and obtain a quick divorce, and hired Diana Hironaga, Joseph Balignasa, and Ricardo Murillo to assist MacGuigan.
- Moseley, believing Patricia Margello was a bad influence on MacGuigan, arranged for Hironaga, Balignasa, and Murillo to murder her.
- During the evening of August 1 through the early morning of August 2, 1998, Hironaga lured Margello to a motel room in Las Vegas where Murillo and Balignasa were present.
- Margello called MacGuigan from the motel room, stating she was with Hironaga and Murillo and had a “bad feeling.”
- After the call, Murillo pushed Margello onto the bed, and with Balignasa holding her feet and Hironaga her arms, Murillo strangled Margello to death with a belt.
- Murillo, Balignasa, and Hironaga then wrapped Margello's body in trash bags and a sheet, securing it with tape and cables, and stuffed it into the motel room's air conditioning duct.
- Moseley arranged for Murillo and Hironaga to travel to Philadelphia to collect payment, where Murillo received $10,000 and Hironaga received $5,000.
- On September 1, 1998, Murillo was questioned by police, denied involvement, and made false statements; investigators discovered his white Ford Tempo and seized it, later finding two hotel towels matching those from the murder scene inside.
Procedural Posture:
- On September 22, 1998, a federal grand jury indicted Ricardo Murillo, Diana Hironaga, and Christopher Moseley on conspiracy and murder-for-hire charges.
- On October 9, 1998, Murillo, Hironaga, and Moseley were arraigned, and a tentative trial date was set for November 30, 1998.
- In November 1998, the district court granted the government an 'ends of justice' continuance, over Murillo’s objection, rescheduling the trial to October 1999.
- In January 1999, Murillo’s request that his trial be severed from that of his co-defendants was granted, but his trial date was not advanced.
- On April 14, 1999, the government gave notice of its intent not to seek the death penalty.
- In May 1999, co-defendant Hironaga entered into a plea agreement and agreed to testify against Moseley and Murillo.
- On June 11, 1999, Murillo, despite earlier objections, joined the government in a stipulation to continue deadline dates for motions.
- On July 1, 1999, Murillo filed a motion to suppress physical evidence (towels from his car) and a Motion to Dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act.
- On August 6, 1999, the Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending denial of Murillo’s motion to suppress physical evidence.
- On August 27, 1999, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation to Deny Murillo’s Motion to Dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act.
- On August 30, 1999, the district court issued an Order affirming the Magistrate Judge’s Report denying Murillo’s motion to suppress physical evidence.
- On September 22, 1999, the district court issued an Order denying Murillo’s Motion to Dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act.
- On November 8, 1999, Murillo’s trial began, and he was subsequently convicted by a jury of murder-for-hire charges and sentenced to concurrent life terms, from which he appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a thirteen-month delay between indictment and trial, attributable in part to the government's death penalty evaluation process and case complexity, violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial or the Speedy Trial Act, and does a prosecutor's peremptory strike of a juror based on perceived communication difficulty and lifestyle choices constitute purposeful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky?
Opinions:
Majority - Goodwin, Circuit Judge
No, the thirteen-month delay between Ricardo Murillo's indictment and trial did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial or the Speedy Trial Act, and the prosecution's peremptory strike of a juror was not purposeful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. The court first addressed the Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, applying the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. Although the thirteen-month delay was “presumptively prejudicial,” triggering the inquiry, the length of the delay only “militated slightly” in Murillo’s favor. The reasons for the delay, primarily the government’s need to complete a death penalty evaluation and the acknowledged complexity of the case, were deemed proper. Murillo's assertion of his speedy trial right was inconsistent, as he later joined in a stipulation for continuances. The court found no prejudice to Murillo, noting his motion to sever from co-defendants had been granted ten months before trial. Consequently, Murillo’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Regarding the Speedy Trial Act (STA), the court affirmed the district court’s grant of an “ends of justice” continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The government’s need for time to evaluate the death penalty, a reason supported by precedent from other circuits, was found to be a valid basis for continuance. The complexity of the case, a point Murillo himself stipulated to, further justified the delay. The district court provided specific, sufficient reasons for its finding that the ends of justice outweighed the public and defendant's interest in a speedy trial, meeting the STA's requirements. Addressing Murillo’s Batson challenge, the court found no clear error in the trial court's rejection of the claim of purposeful discrimination. The prosecution offered several race-neutral reasons for striking juror Luzviminda Pafias, including her employment as a casino blackjack dealer, her statement that she had never read a book, her favorite TV show being 'Judge Judy,' and crucially, her perceived difficulty communicating. The court emphasized that the second step of Batson does not demand a persuasive or plausible explanation, only a race-neutral one. The perceived difficulty communicating, which the trial judge is uniquely positioned to assess based on demeanor, was a permissible ground, and no discriminatory intent was inherent in the reasons offered. Therefore, the Batson challenge was correctly denied. Other alleged errors regarding the motion to suppress, hearsay testimony, excluded evidence, and the effect of a co-defendant's confession were also reviewed and found not to warrant reversal.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the substantial deference appellate courts grant to trial court decisions on speedy trial continuances and jury selection, particularly in complex federal prosecutions involving capital punishment considerations. It clarifies that a defendant's inconsistent assertions of speedy trial rights can undermine their claim and that specific, articulated reasons for 'ends of justice' continuances are critical under the Speedy Trial Act. The decision also affirms that perceived communication issues, alongside other non-discriminatory factors, are valid race-neutral explanations for peremptory strikes in Batson challenges, emphasizing the trial judge's unique position to assess juror demeanor and credibility. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of focusing on the declarant's trustworthiness, not the in-court witness, when evaluating Confrontation Clause challenges to hearsay statements.
