United States v. Reid
214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 2002 WL 1733925, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13643 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
An independent bar, free from government-imposed affirmation requirements for defense counsel, is critical to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the integrity of the adversarial justice system, allowing courts to exercise discretion to excuse such requirements where the government concedes the constitutional issue.
Facts:
- Richard C. Reid is alleged to have attempted to detonate bombs concealed in his shoes on American Airlines Flight 63 on December 22, 2001, while over the Atlantic Ocean.
- Reid was turned over to the F.B.I. upon the plane's diversion to Boston.
- The Attorney General promulgated emergency regulations allowing for the imposition of “Special Administrative Measures” (SAMs) upon federal prisoners posing a substantial risk of violence, and SAMs were issued against Reid under this authority.
- On February 19, 2002, the Marshals Service unilaterally imposed case-specific SAMs on Reid, which included a requirement that his defense counsel sign an affirmation acknowledging receipt of the SAM restrictions and agreeing to abide by them.
- The SAMs also imposed various restrictions on defense counsel's dissemination of information received from Reid and limited who could meet with him without his attorneys present.
- On March 4, 2002, Reid's attorneys informed the government that they would not sign any such affirmation.
- Approximately six days later, the government entirely cut off defense counsels’ communication with Reid.
Procedural Posture:
- An American grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted Richard C. Reid on federal charges.
- Reid was arraigned and ordered detained after a hearing before Magistrate Judge Judith Dein, who appointed the Federal Defender Office as his counsel.
- On February 19, 2002, the Marshals Service unilaterally imposed Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) on Reid's detention, which included an affirmation requirement for his defense counsel.
- After Reid's attorneys refused to sign the affirmation, the government cut off communication between counsel and Reid.
- On March 25, 2002, defense counsel filed an emergency motion to enjoin the Attorney General and United States Attorney from barring their communication with Reid.
- The District Court (Young, Chief Judge) held an emergency hearing and issued an "Emergency Order" on March 25, 2002, which initially rejected the applicability of SAMs to Reid, allowed attorney access, prohibited monitoring, and restricted counsel's dissemination of Reid's communications, also ordering that Reid not be moved without court permission.
- On May 7, 2002, Reid moved to dissolve the protective order placing limits upon counsel’s disclosure of information received from him.
- On June 3, 2002, after oral argument, the District Court issued a "June 3 Order" which modified the Emergency Order, adopting a more limited protective order regarding information dissemination and explicitly stating that the United States shall not require any specific undertaking or affirmation from defense counsel without express court order.
- On June 19, 2002, the government informed the court that it had further modified Reid's SAMs to conform to the court's order, specifically adding an exception to the affirmation requirement where it is "excused, precluded, or barred by judicial determination," placing the final decision about the affirmation requirement before the court.
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Issue:
Should the court, in the exercise of its discretion, enforce a government-imposed affirmation requirement for defense counsel acknowledging Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) as a condition of attorney-client communication, given the importance of an independent bar to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel?
Opinions:
Majority - William G. Young, Chief Judge
No, the court determines, in the exercise of its discretion, not to require an affirmation from Reid's defense counsel because the government's modification of the SAMs rendered the constitutional issue moot, allowing the court to prioritize the independence of the bar and the proper functioning of the adversarial system. The court vacates its 'do not move him' order. The court initially erred in its Emergency Order by finding SAMs inapplicable to pre-trial detainees and asserting judicial custody, correcting itself by acknowledging that Reid, as a pre-trial detainee, is in executive custody, making SAMs presumptively valid unless they violate constitutional guarantees or are punitive. The government's subsequent modification of the SAMs, making the affirmation requirement optional based on judicial determination, eliminated the need for a constitutional ruling on the Sixth Amendment. Even without a constitutional imperative, the court, exercising its discretion, refuses to enforce the affirmation requirement due to the 'vital role of the advocate' in the adversarial system. An independent bar, free from government pressure or requirements to affirm their bona fides, is essential for a zealous defense and the proper functioning of justice. Requiring such an affirmation fundamentally intrudes on this role, making counsel subordinate to the executive rather than only to existing laws, court rules, ethical requirements, and court orders. The court takes judicial notice of the indictment of attorney Lynne Stewart for allegedly violating SAMs after signing an affirmation, highlighting the 'chilling effect' such requirements can have on attorneys representing unpopular defendants and the importance of judicial prudence in avoiding such issues when not constitutionally mandated. The court also vacates its prior 'do not move him' order sua sponte, acknowledging it was entered in haste due to fears of Reid being moved to a military tribunal. Upon reflection, this order was deemed ineffective (as the government could simply drop charges) and unwise, as the government had chosen to pursue a public trial before an American jury, demonstrating faith in democratic institutions. Maintaining the order would implicitly question this faith.
Analysis:
This case highlights the tension between executive power in national security contexts and the constitutional right to counsel, particularly in the post-9/11 era. By avoiding a direct constitutional ruling due to the government's concession, the court reinforces the judiciary's role in safeguarding the integrity of the adversarial system and the independence of the bar, even while acknowledging the executive's broad authority over pre-trial detainees. The court's emphasis on judicial discretion in shaping conditions of confinement, especially regarding attorney-client communication, provides a significant check on executive overreach, influencing how future SAMs or similar administrative measures might be implemented and challenged. It also serves as a strong judicial endorsement of the critical role of independent defense counsel in a democracy, especially for unpopular defendants.
