United States v. Rahimi
602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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Rule of Law:
When a court has found an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. A modern firearm regulation is constitutional if it is consistent with the principles underpinning the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, even if it is not a 'historical twin' of a founding-era law.
Facts:
- Zackey Rahimi and his girlfriend, C.M., had an argument in a parking lot, during which Rahimi grabbed C.M., dragged her to his car, and shoved her inside, causing her to hit her head.
- When a bystander witnessed the altercation, Rahimi retrieved a gun and fired a shot as C.M. fled.
- A Texas state court issued a two-year domestic violence protective order against Rahimi after a hearing where it found he had committed family violence and represented a 'credible threat' to the physical safety of C.M. or their child.
- The protective order explicitly prohibited Rahimi from possessing a firearm.
- While the order was in effect, Rahimi threatened a different woman with a gun and was identified as a suspect in at least five separate shooting incidents.
- Police obtained a warrant to search Rahimi's home, where they discovered a pistol, a rifle, ammunition, and a copy of the restraining order.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States indicted Zackey Rahimi in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
- Rahimi filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment on its face.
- The District Court, bound by existing circuit precedent, denied Rahimi's motion.
- Rahimi pleaded guilty but preserved his right to appeal the constitutional issue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- While Rahimi's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen.
- In light of Bruen, the Fifth Circuit panel withdrew its initial opinion, requested new briefing, and ultimately reversed the District Court, holding that § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional.
- The United States (petitioner) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits individuals subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm, violate the Second Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No. Section 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment because the nation's history and tradition of firearm regulation allows for the temporary disarmament of individuals found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. The Court's methodology, established in Bruen, does not require a 'historical twin' or 'dead ringer' but rather a historical analogue that is 'relevantly similar' in principle. The analysis focuses on both 'why' and 'how' the regulation burdens the Second Amendment right. Here, historical 'surety' laws (which required bonds from those suspected of future misbehavior) and 'going armed' laws (which punished menacing others with firearms) confirm a tradition of disarming those who threaten physical violence. Section 922(g)(8) is consistent with this tradition because it is also aimed at preventing violence ('why') and is narrowly targeted at specific individuals after a judicial finding of dangerousness ('how'), rather than being a broad prohibition on the general public. The Fifth Circuit erred by requiring a precise historical match and by focusing on hypothetical unconstitutional applications in a facial challenge.
Concurring - Justice Sotomayor
No. The Court correctly applies Bruen to uphold the statute by emphasizing that a regulation need only be consistent with the 'principles' of historical tradition, not a 'precise historical match.' This approach avoids the dissent's rigid, exacting historical inquiry that would make it nearly impossible to sustain common-sense regulations for modern problems, like domestic violence, which were not addressed with specific statutes at the founding. While this case is correctly decided under Bruen, the means-end scrutiny rejected in that case remains a better framework, as it would directly consider the government's compelling interest in preventing domestic gun violence, a problem of staggering severity.
Concurring - Justice Gorsuch
No. Rahimi's facial challenge fails because the government has shown that, in at least some applications, § 922(g)(8) is consistent with historical regulations like surety laws and prohibitions on 'going armed.' These traditions allow for temporary disarmament after a judicial determination that an individual poses a threat. However, this decision is narrow and resolves only the facial challenge. It does not decide whether the statute could be unconstitutional as-applied in other circumstances, such as when there is no judicial finding of a 'credible threat,' when the disarmament is permanent, or when it prevents the use of a firearm in self-defense.
Concurring - Justice Kavanaugh
No. This opinion joins the Court's application of the text, history, and precedent framework from Heller and Bruen. Constitutional interpretation, particularly of vague text, must be guided by history, not the policy preferences of judges. Both pre-ratification and post-ratification history (tradition) are crucial tools for discerning the original meaning and scope of constitutional rights. This historical approach is superior to subjective balancing tests like means-end scrutiny, as it provides a neutral constraint on judicial decision-making. The Court's opinion properly analyzes the historical tradition and correctly concludes that the temporary disarmament of dangerous individuals is consistent with the Second Amendment.
Concurring - Justice Barrett
No. Bruen's originalist approach requires examining historical regulations to identify the 'original contours' of the Second Amendment right. The Fifth Circuit erred by demanding a 'historical twin.' The proper inquiry is to extract a principle from historical regulations. Here, the historical record reveals a clear principle: legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i), which applies only after a judicial finding of a credible threat, fits comfortably within this principle, so Rahimi's facial challenge must fail.
Concurring - Justice Jackson
No. Today's decision fairly applies the binding precedent of Bruen, and I join the opinion in full. However, the struggles of lower courts since Bruen demonstrate the unworkability of its history-and-tradition-only test. The message from lower courts is that the standard is creating confusion and inconsistent outcomes, forcing judges to act as amateur historians without clear guidance. Today's clarification that a 'historical twin' is not required is a welcome step, but it also serves as a tacit admission that the Bruen framework is difficult to apply in practice. The pre-Bruen two-step framework incorporating means-end scrutiny had created relative harmony and should be preferred.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
Yes. The statute violates the Second Amendment because the government has failed to identify a single historical regulation that is 'relevantly similar' to § 922(g)(8). The Court's proffered analogues—surety and affray laws—are 'worlds, not degrees, apart.' Surety laws, which addressed the same problem of interpersonal violence, imposed a 'materially different' and far less burdensome penalty (posting a bond), rather than completely stripping an individual of their Second Amendment rights. Affray laws are also dissimilar because they addressed public terror, not private domestic disputes, and were criminal statutes with higher burdens of proof. The majority errs by impermissibly cobbling together pieces of different historical laws to create a justification, an approach that our precedents foreclose and that gives the government a 'regulatory blank check.'
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the Court's Second Amendment test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen. The Court rejects the narrow 'historical twin' approach that some lower courts had adopted, instead endorsing a more flexible 'historical analogue' analysis based on underlying principles. By focusing on the 'why' (the purpose) and 'how' (the burden) of a regulation, the Court makes it easier for the government to defend modern gun laws that address societal problems not explicitly regulated at the founding. This ruling provides crucial guidance to lower courts and will likely result in the validation of more firearm regulations than the stricter interpretation of Bruen would have allowed.
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