United States v. Pohlot, Stephen
827 F.2d 889, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 1121, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 11347 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. § 17) prohibits diminished responsibility and diminished capacity defenses that excuse or mitigate an offense due to a defendant's supposed psychiatric compulsion or inability to reflect; however, it does not bar the use of evidence of mental abnormality to negate specific intent (mens rea) when such intent is an element of the charged offense.
Facts:
- Stephen Pohlot was a successful pharmacist living with his wife, Elizabeth, and their children, but claimed their relationship was dominated by Elizabeth's abuse, including physical violence and strange behavior with numerous pets.
- In the summer of 1985, Elizabeth obtained a court order removing Stephen from their home and subsequently filed for divorce, freezing his assets.
- Shortly after the divorce filing, Stephen told his friend George Neustadt that he was considering killing his wife and asked if Neustadt knew anyone who could arrange the murder.
- Neustadt contacted Michael Selkow, who was secretly a government informer, and relayed Stephen's request.
- Stephen later met with Selkow, agreeing to pay $25,000 for his wife's murder and providing an immediate payment of $8,000, along with details about Elizabeth, her cars, and her routine, stressing the murder should 'appear to be an accident.'
- Two weeks later, at the FBI's direction, Selkow told Stephen that the hitman had arrived and later, in a separate meeting, instructed Stephen to call to cancel the murder to 'buy time' and 'throw authorities off the track,' while assuring him the murder would still occur.
- Stephen subsequently called Selkow to express his desire to cancel the murder, but FBI agents suspected this call was planned by Selkow.
Procedural Posture:
- Stephen Pohlot was indicted on five counts of using interstate commerce facilities for murder for hire and one count of conspiring to commit that offense.
- At trial, the district court allowed Pohlot's counsel to argue that his mental abnormality indicated a lack of mens rea but rejected Pohlot’s proposed jury instruction that specifically allowed the jury to consider testimony about his abnormal mental condition for the specific intent issue.
- The jury found Pohlot guilty on all counts.
- Pohlot then moved for a judgment of acquittal or for a new trial, arguing that the court had improperly failed to instruct the jury to consider evidence of his mental condition regarding mens rea.
- The district court denied Pohlot’s motion, ruling that he was asserting a 'diminished capacity defense' that Congress had abolished in the Insanity Defense Reform Act.
- Pohlot appealed this decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, solely on the issue of mens rea.
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Issue:
Does the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 preclude a criminal defendant from introducing evidence of mental abnormality to negate the specific intent (mens rea) element of an offense, or does it only prohibit affirmative defenses like diminished responsibility or diminished capacity?
Opinions:
Majority - Becker, Circuit Judge
No, the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 does not preclude a criminal defendant from introducing evidence of mental abnormality to negate the specific intent (mens rea) element of an offense; however, the specific evidence offered by Pohlot in this case did not support a legally acceptable theory of lack of mens rea and therefore was properly excluded. The court reasoned that Section 17(a) of the Act, stating that 'mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense,' aims to prohibit affirmative defenses that excuse misconduct, not evidence that disproves an element of the crime itself. Using evidence of mental abnormality to negate mens rea is viewed as a rule of evidence, not an independent defense. The legislative history and congressional debate confirm this distinction, showing an intent to bar defenses like 'diminished responsibility' (which might mitigate punishment based on a defendant's 'moral culpability' or 'capacity to form intent,' even if intent existed) but to preserve the relevance of mental disorder to prove a lack of actual mens rea (e.g., specific intent, knowledge). Furthermore, a blanket bar on such evidence would raise serious constitutional concerns under In re Winship, which requires the government to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and would conflict with Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Leland v. Oregon, Martin v. Ohio) affirming a defendant's right to present evidence negating elements of the prosecution's case. Applying this standard, the court found Pohlot's evidence (that his plot was a 'fantasy' or he 'did not really know' what hiring a killer meant) did not truly negate his specific intent in a legal sense. His actions, including careful planning, payment, and concern for concealment, demonstrated considerable awareness and purpose. The psychiatric testimony focused on Pohlot's 'unconscious' mind or 'meaningful understanding' rather than his conscious intent. The court concluded that such evidence, as presented, amounted to a legally unacceptable 'partially diminished capacity' defense, which the Act abolished, rather than genuinely disproving the element of specific intent to commit murder for hire.
Analysis:
This case is highly significant for clarifying the interplay between mental abnormality, specific intent, and the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984. It safeguards a defendant's constitutional right to challenge the mens rea element of a crime, while simultaneously preventing the reintroduction of broad 'diminished responsibility' defenses under the guise of negating intent. Future courts must carefully scrutinize psychiatric evidence to ensure it directly addresses whether the defendant actually possessed the requisite mental state, rather than merely suggesting a general psychological compulsion or diminished moral understanding. This precedent demands a clear line between disproving an element of the offense and asserting an affirmative defense, impacting how mental health evidence is presented in federal criminal trials.
