United States v. Piper
298 F.3d 47, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15010, 2002 WL 1626125 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), a coconspirator's out-of-court statement is not made 'in furtherance of the conspiracy' if it is antithetical to the conspiracy's central objective, such as attempting to divert a customer to a new, competing criminal enterprise.
Facts:
- Anthony Stilkey and Stanley M. Piper were coworkers at Bath Iron Works in Maine.
- On April 8, 1999, Stilkey agreed to sell cocaine to an informant named Rodney. Stilkey took money from Rodney, went to Piper's apartment, exchanged the money for cocaine from Piper, and then delivered the drugs to Rodney.
- On April 13, 1999, Stilkey met with undercover DEA agent Uri Shafir to sell a larger amount of cocaine. Stilkey took a $500 deposit from Shafir, which he gave to Piper.
- Later that day, Piper went to Stilkey's home and provided a bag of cocaine. Stilkey delivered the cocaine to Shafir, collected an additional $900, and gave the money to Piper.
- On April 20, 1999, Shafir purchased another half-ounce of cocaine from Stilkey, who later testified that Piper had supplied the drugs and received the sale proceeds.
- Shortly after the April 20 transaction, Piper left for Florida.
- On April 22, 1999, Stilkey had a recorded conversation with Shafir in which he complained about Piper's drug quality, identified Piper as his former supplier, and tried to interest Shafir in purchasing drugs from a new source.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted Stanley M. Piper on one count of cocaine distribution and one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
- The case proceeded to trial in the United States District Court.
- During the trial, the government sought to introduce seven tape-recorded conversations. Over Piper's objection, the district court admitted all seven tapes into evidence under the coconspirator hearsay exception.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.
- The district court sentenced Piper to a 27-month term of imprisonment.
- Piper, as the appellant, filed a timely appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, challenging the admission of the recorded conversations.
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Issue:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), is a coconspirator's statement made 'in furtherance of the conspiracy' if it is designed to persuade a customer to purchase drugs from a new supplier, thereby frustrating the original conspiracy's goals?
Opinions:
Majority - Selya, Circuit Judge.
No. A coconspirator's statement is not made 'in furtherance of the conspiracy' if it is antithetical to the conspiracy's central purpose. The court reasoned that the charged conspiracy's objective was to distribute drugs supplied by Piper. Stilkey's statements on April 22 were an attempt to persuade Shafir to buy drugs from a different source, which would frustrate, not further, the Piper-Stilkey conspiracy. Statements that undermine a conspiracy's goals are not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). However, the court found the admission of this specific conversation to be harmless error because the other evidence against Piper, including six other properly admitted recordings and multiple witness testimonies, was overwhelming. The court determined it was highly probable that the erroneous admission of the April 22 conversation did not influence the jury's verdict, and therefore affirmed Piper's conviction.
Analysis:
This case clarifies a significant limitation on the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule (FRE 801(d)(2)(E)). The court's analysis emphasizes that the 'in furtherance' requirement is not a formality; a statement must genuinely advance the conspiracy's objectives to be admissible. By excluding statements that are 'antithetic' to the conspiracy's purpose, the ruling prevents the exception from being used to admit conversations that actively undermine or seek to terminate the criminal enterprise. This precedent guides lower courts to conduct a more substantive inquiry into the purpose and effect of a coconspirator's statement, rather than just its timing or context, thereby reinforcing the rule's intended scope.
