United States of America v. Julio Piccinonna
885 F.2d 1529 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A per se rule of inadmissibility for polygraph evidence is no longer warranted; instead, such evidence may be admitted at the trial court's discretion either when the parties stipulate to its admission in advance or when it is used to impeach or corroborate a witness's testimony, subject to specific conditions and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Facts:
- Julio Piccinonna was involved in the waste disposal business in South Florida.
- A Grand Jury investigated potential antitrust violations, specifically an alleged agreement among waste disposal firms not to compete for each other's accounts.
- Piccinonna was compelled to testify before the Grand Jury under a grant of immunity, which did not protect him from perjury charges.
- During his testimony, Piccinonna stated that he had not heard of any agreement between garbage companies to refrain from soliciting each other's accounts.
- Other witnesses testified before the Grand Jury, implicating Piccinonna in the alleged agreement.
- After being indicted for perjury, Piccinonna voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination administered by a licensed examiner, George B. Slattery.
- Piccinonna asserted that the polygraph report indicated he did not lie during his Grand Jury testimony.
Procedural Posture:
- Julio Piccinonna was indicted on four counts of perjury for making false material statements to a Grand Jury.
- Before trial in the U.S. District Court, Piccinonna filed a motion to admit the results of a privately administered polygraph test.
- The district court, bound by circuit precedent establishing a per se rule against polygraph evidence, denied the motion.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Piccinonna on two counts of perjury.
- The district court then held a post-trial hearing to create a record for appeal on the polygraph admissibility issue.
- Piccinonna (appellant) appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing the trial court erred by excluding the polygraph evidence.
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Issue:
Does the per se rule categorically excluding the admission of polygraph evidence remain valid, or should it be modified to allow for its admission in certain circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Fay, Circuit Judge
No, the per se rule is no longer valid and should be modified. The court establishes new principles allowing for the admission of polygraph evidence in limited circumstances because significant progress in polygraph technology and its widespread use by government agencies mean it is no longer accurate to categorically state that the science lacks general acceptance. The court abandoned the rigid Frye standard in favor of a balancing approach that weighs the need for relevant evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. The court outlined two scenarios for admissibility: 1) when both parties stipulate in advance to the test's circumstances and the scope of its admissibility, and 2) when the evidence is used to impeach or corroborate a witness's testimony, provided there is adequate notice, the opposing party has an opportunity for its own test, and the evidence complies with rules like FRE 608. The trial court retains broad discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence (esp. FRE 403 and 702) to exclude the evidence on grounds of prejudice, examiner qualifications, or improper test administration.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Johnson, Circuit Judge
Yes, the per se rule should remain valid for unstipulated polygraph evidence. While concurring that stipulated evidence may be admissible, the dissent argues that the scientific community remains sharply divided on the polygraph's reliability and its underlying assumptions. Judge Johnson contends that polygraphy's accuracy is only slightly better than chance and that subjects can use countermeasures to defeat the test. Citing the high potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and waste of time under FRE 403, the dissent concludes that the evidence's minimal probative value is substantially outweighed by these dangers. Therefore, unstipulated polygraph evidence should not be admissible for impeachment or any other purpose under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant departure from the long-standing per se rule against polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit, moving from a bright-line exclusion to a discretionary, case-by-case approach. By creating limited pathways for admissibility, the court shifted the inquiry from a rigid 'general acceptance' test to a flexible balancing test under the Federal Rules of Evidence. This precedent places a greater burden on trial judges to act as gatekeepers, requiring them to scrutinize the reliability and potential prejudice of proffered polygraph evidence. The ruling opens the door for 'battles of the experts' at the trial level over examiner qualifications, testing procedures, and the specific application of the science in a given case.
