United States v. Phelps
14 Fed. R. Serv. 877, 572 F. Supp. 262, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12792 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant cannot introduce their own exculpatory out-of-court statement because it does not qualify as an admission by a party-opponent, which must be offered against the declarant. Furthermore, such a statement will not qualify as a present sense impression if it describes a past event, nor as an excited utterance if the declarant had a significant opportunity to reflect and fabricate before making the statement.
Facts:
- Police officers were conducting a stakeout in a mobile home park in Kenton County, Kentucky.
- The defendants, Phelps and Taylor, were observed arriving in a Lincoln Continental automobile with a Florida license plate.
- Investigation revealed the car was a rental from Budget Rent-a-Car, was two days overdue, and should not have been taken outside of Florida.
- Budget Rent-a-Car instructed the officers to repossess the vehicle.
- Officers informed the defendants of the repossession and asked them to remove their personal belongings from the car.
- While the defendants were removing their items, officers discovered large bales of marijuana and a gym bag containing cocaine in the trunk.
- Upon the officers' discovery of the cocaine, defendant Phelps stated, “That is my gym bag, but Taylor put it in the trunk.”
Procedural Posture:
- The United States prosecuted defendants Phelps and Taylor in U.S. District Court for willful possession of drugs with intent to distribute.
- During the trial, counsel for defendant Phelps sought to introduce a statement Phelps made at the scene through the testimony of a police officer.
- Co-defendant Taylor objected to the admission of the statement, arguing it was hearsay and violated his rights under the confrontation clause.
- Phelps responded that the statement was admissible under the hearsay exceptions for an admission, a present sense impression, or an excited utterance.
- The trial court conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury, pursuant to F.R.Ev. 104(a), to determine the admissibility of the proffered statement.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's out-of-court statement, which admits ownership of an item but shifts criminal blame to a co-defendant, fall under the hearsay exceptions for an admission by a party-opponent, present sense impression, or excited utterance when offered by the defendant himself?
Opinions:
Majority - Bertelsman, District Judge
No. A defendant's own out-of-court statement offered in his favor is inadmissible hearsay and does not qualify for the exceptions for admissions, present sense impressions, or excited utterances. First, the statement is not an admission under F.R.E. 801(d)(2) because this rule only applies when the statement is offered against the party who made it; a party cannot introduce their own 'self-serving declaration' under this rule. Second, it is not a present sense impression under F.R.E. 803(1) because the statement concerned a past event (Taylor putting the bag in the trunk), not an event the declarant was perceiving at that moment. Third, it is not an excited utterance under F.R.E. 803(2) because the declarant had approximately an hour and a half between the police arrival and the drug discovery to reflect and fabricate an explanation, which negates the spontaneity required for this exception.
Analysis:
This opinion provides a clear application of fundamental hearsay rules, reinforcing the principle that the admission by a party-opponent exception is not a sword for the declarant to use, but a shield for the opposing party. It illustrates that courts will strictly scrutinize the foundational requirements for hearsay exceptions like present sense impression and excited utterance. The court's analysis of the excited utterance is particularly significant, as it demonstrates that the opportunity to reflect and fabricate before the startling event can destroy the spontaneity necessary for the exception to apply, expanding the temporal analysis beyond the moments immediately following the event.
