United States v. Pheaster
544 F.2d 353 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
Under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, a declarant's statement of intent to perform an act in the future is admissible as evidence that the declarant performed that act, even when the statement describes meeting or acting with another person.
Facts:
- Larry Adell was the 16-year-old son of a wealthy businessman, Robert Adell.
- On the evening of June 1, 1974, Larry Adell told his friends at a Sambo's North restaurant that he was going into the parking lot to meet a man named 'Angelo' (Inciso) to get a pound of free marijuana.
- Adell left the restaurant to go to the parking lot and was never seen by his family or friends again.
- A few hours later, Robert Adell received a phone call demanding a $400,000 ransom for his son's return.
- Over the next month, the Adell family received ten letters and two phone calls from the kidnappers containing instructions and threats.
- Four separate attempts to deliver the ransom money failed for various reasons.
- All communication from the kidnappers ceased after June 30, 1974.
- On July 14, 1974, the F.B.I. arrested Angelo Inciso and his co-defendant, Pheaster.
Procedural Posture:
- Pheaster and Inciso were charged in a 12-count indictment in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the trial court of first instance.
- During the jury trial, the government sought to introduce hearsay testimony from Larry Adell's friends regarding his stated plan to meet Inciso.
- Inciso's counsel made a timely objection on the grounds that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.
- The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony under the state-of-mind exception, providing a limiting instruction to the jury.
- The jury convicted Pheaster and Inciso on all counts.
- Inciso, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony.
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Issue:
Is a declarant's hearsay statement expressing an intent to do an act with another person admissible to prove that the declarant and the other person acted in accordance with that intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Renfrew, District Judge
Yes. A declarant's statement of intent to perform an act with another person is admissible to prove that the act occurred. The court acknowledged the theoretical difficulty in using a declarant's state of mind to prove the actions of a third party, but found the weight of authority, stemming from Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, compelled this result. In Hillmon, the Supreme Court held that letters from a man (Walters) stating his intention to travel with another man (Hillmon) were admissible to make it 'more probable both that he did go and that he went with Hillmon.' The court found this principle, known as the Hillmon doctrine, directly applicable to Adell's statements about meeting Inciso. The court concluded that Adell's statements of his intention to meet Angelo were admissible to prove he did, in fact, meet Angelo in the parking lot.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Ely, Circuit Judge
No. While bound by precedent, the judge disagreed with the admission of the victim's statement to prove the actions of another. The judge argued that Adell's statement was highly prejudicial to Inciso and that 'A declaration as to what one person intended to do... cannot safely be accepted as evidence of what another probably did.' He expressed strong agreement with the critics of the Hillmon doctrine, such as Justice Cardozo and Justice Traynor, who warned against the unreliability of such inferences. The judge noted that the House Judiciary Committee's comments on the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 803(3)) explicitly sought to limit the Hillmon doctrine to prove only the declarant's future conduct, not the future conduct of another person, indicating that the majority's broad application is now widely considered flawed.
Analysis:
This case serves as a crucial, albeit controversial, affirmation of the broad scope of the Hillmon doctrine. The court's decision allows a declarant's statement of intent to be used as circumstantial evidence of not only the declarant's subsequent actions but also the actions of a third party mentioned in the statement. This ruling solidifies a powerful evidentiary tool for prosecutors, but it also highlights the significant debate over the reliability of such hearsay and its potential for prejudice. The opinion foreshadows the eventual split in legal interpretation, as reflected in the legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), where the House Committee explicitly rejected this broad application.
