United States v. Perkins
1886 U.S. LEXIS 1788, 6 S. Ct. 449, 116 U.S. 483 (1886)
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Rule of Law:
When Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest.
Facts:
- The plaintiff entered the Naval Academy as a cadet-engineer in 1877.
- He graduated from the academy on June 10, 1881.
- On June 26, 1883, the Secretary of the Navy sent the plaintiff a letter informing him of his honorable discharge, effective June 30, 1883.
- The stated reason for the discharge was that there were no vacancies to fill in the naval service.
- The plaintiff protested the discharge as illegal, refused the offered severance pay, and continued to regard himself as a member of the naval service.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued the United States in the Court of Claims to recover his salary for the period following his purported discharge.
- The Court of Claims rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
- The United States (appellant) appealed the judgment of the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does Congress have the authority to limit a department head's power to remove an inferior officer whom the department head is statutorily authorized to appoint?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Matthews
Yes. When Congress vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, it has the constitutional authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal of those officers. The court reasoned that a department head's power to appoint is not a constitutional prerogative but is derived entirely from legislation enacted by Congress. Therefore, Congress, in granting the power to appoint, may also regulate all incidents of that power, including removal. The court determined that a cadet-engineer appointed by the Secretary of the Navy is an 'inferior officer' within the meaning of the Constitution, not a mere employee. Since Congress had established specific procedures for the removal of naval officers (such as by court-martial under Rev. Stat. § 1229), the Secretary of the Navy could not remove the plaintiff at will. Because the plaintiff was not dismissed according to the statutory procedures, his discharge was illegal, and he remained an officer entitled to his pay.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Congress's authority to regulate the tenure of inferior officers within the executive branch, forming a crucial pillar for the creation of a merit-based civil service and military. By distinguishing the statutory appointment power of department heads from the President's constitutional appointment power, the case carves out a significant area of legislative control over the executive bureaucracy. This precedent ensures that Congress can protect certain federal officials from at-will removal by their superiors, thereby promoting stability and insulating parts of the government from purely political personnel changes. The ruling reinforces the principle that a department head's administrative powers are subject to the statutory limits imposed by the legislature that granted those powers.
