United States v. Peoni
100 F.2d 401 (1938)
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Rule of Law:
To be liable as an accessory or co-conspirator, a person must possess a purposive attitude toward the commission of the offense, meaning they must associate themselves with the venture, participate in it as something they wish to bring about, and seek by their action to make it succeed.
Facts:
- In the Bronx, Peoni sold counterfeit bills to Regno.
- Both Peoni and Regno knew the bills were counterfeit.
- Regno then sold the same counterfeit bills to Dorsey, also in the Bronx.
- Dorsey also knew the bills were counterfeit.
- Dorsey was arrested in Brooklyn while attempting to pass the counterfeit bills.
Procedural Posture:
- Peoni was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on counts of possessing counterfeit money and conspiracy to possess it.
- Following a trial, a jury found Peoni guilty on all counts.
- Peoni, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, against the United States, the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a person who sells counterfeit currency to a middleman become an accessory to a third party's possession of that currency, or a co-conspirator in an agreement for that third party to possess it, when his only role was the initial sale?
Opinions:
Majority - L. Hand
No. A person is not liable as an accessory or co-conspirator without a purposive attitude toward the substantive offense. The court reasoned that criminal liability does not extend to all foreseeable consequences of one's actions, unlike in civil cases. Tracing the history of accomplice liability statutes and common law, the court found that words like 'aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, or procure' all imply a 'purposive attitude' and a desire for the criminal venture to succeed. Peoni's involvement and interest ended once he sold the bills to Regno; he had no stake in what happened to the bills afterward. Similarly, a conspiracy requires a 'concert of purpose,' and Peoni never agreed with anyone that Dorsey should possess the bills; his agreement was limited to the sale to Regno.
Analysis:
This case is foundational for modern accomplice and conspiracy liability, rejecting a broad foreseeability test in favor of a stricter, purpose-based standard. Judge Hand's 'purposive attitude' formulation, requiring that the defendant actively desire the criminal venture to succeed, significantly narrows the scope of liability. This prevents the government from charging individuals who are merely remote links in a causal chain, such as suppliers who know their goods might be used for illegal ends but have no stake in the specific crime. The decision reinforces the principle that criminal law requires a higher level of mens rea (guilty mind) than simply knowing a crime is a probable outcome of one's actions.
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