United States v. Paul Dameron Midgett
62 Fed. R. Serv. 1077, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18242, 342 F.3d 321 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court commits reversible error when it forces a criminal defendant to choose between their constitutional right to testify and their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, based merely on defense counsel's uncorroborated belief that the defendant's proposed testimony would be perjurious.
Facts:
- In October 1999, J.W. Shaw, Jr., was robbed and severely burned when an assailant threw gasoline on him and ignited it.
- Paul Midgett and his co-defendant, Theresa Russell, were charged with the assault on Shaw and a subsequent bank robbery using a similar method.
- Russell entered into a plea agreement and cooperated with the government.
- Midgett consistently maintained his innocence regarding the assault on Shaw, claiming a third person committed the crime while Midgett was asleep in the vehicle.
- Midgett wished to testify to this 'third person' defense at trial.
- Midgett's defense attorney strongly disbelieved this account because he could find no corroborating evidence and Russell denied the existence of any third person.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul Midgett was charged in the U.S. District Court for multiple federal crimes.
- Before and during trial, Midgett's appointed counsel moved to withdraw, citing a conflict over Midgett's insistence on testifying to a defense the lawyer believed was false.
- The trial court denied the motion to withdraw but presented Midgett with an ultimatum: proceed with his attorney and waive his right to testify, or proceed without an attorney and testify on his own behalf.
- Midgett stated he could not represent himself, kept his counsel, and consequently did not testify.
- A jury found Midgett guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison.
- Represented by new counsel, Midgett appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial court violate a defendant's constitutional rights by forcing him to choose between testifying on his own behalf without legal representation or retaining counsel and waiving his right to testify, when the conflict arises from the attorney's mere suspicion, rather than actual knowledge, that the defendant's testimony would be false?
Opinions:
Majority - Traxler, J.
Yes, the trial court violated the defendant's constitutional rights. Forcing a defendant to choose between the right to testify and the right to counsel based on an attorney's mere suspicion of perjury is impermissible. The court distinguished this case from Nix v. Whiteside, where the defendant explicitly admitted to his lawyer his intent to commit perjury. Here, Midgett never admitted his story was false; he consistently maintained its truth. An attorney's 'mere belief, albeit a strong one supported by other evidence,' that a client will lie is insufficient to justify refusing to assist in presenting that testimony. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to have actual 'knowledge' of falsity, not just a 'reasonable belief,' to refuse to offer the testimony of a criminal defendant. By accepting the attorney's suspicion and forcing Midgett into a 'Hobson's choice,' the court improperly weighed the evidence, usurped the jury's role as fact-finder, and unconstitutionally corrupted both the right to counsel and the right to testify.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the boundary established in Nix v. Whiteside regarding an attorney's duty when faced with potential client perjury. It establishes that an attorney's suspicion or professional judgment about the truthfulness of a client's story, even when well-founded, does not meet the high standard of 'knowledge' required to infringe upon a defendant's right to testify with the assistance of counsel. The ruling protects a defendant's autonomy to present a defense, even an implausible one, and prevents attorneys and judges from preemptively judging the facts. This precedent reinforces the principle that fundamental constitutional rights cannot be pitted against each other and limits an attorney's ability to withdraw or refuse assistance to situations of confirmed, not merely suspected, perjury.
