United States v. Patricia Lynn Opager
3 Fed. R. Serv. 1013, 589 F.2d 799, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16936 (1979)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) does not bar the admission of extrinsic evidence used to contradict a witness's testimony on a material issue, even if that evidence incidentally impeaches the witness's character for truthfulness.
Facts:
- On February 23, 1977, Patricia Lynn Opager sold cocaine to two law enforcement officers and a government informant, Phillip Posner.
- At her trial, Opager asserted an entrapment defense, claiming she was pressured into the sale by Posner and the officers.
- To counter the entrapment defense by showing Opager's predisposition, the government presented Posner as a witness.
- Posner testified that he had worked at a beauty salon with Opager in 1974 and had observed her engage in cocaine transactions at that time.
- To disprove Posner's testimony, Opager sought to introduce the beauty salon's business records, which she claimed would show that she and Posner did not work together in 1974.
Procedural Posture:
- Patricia Lynn Opager was charged in the U.S. District Court with possession and distribution of cocaine.
- Prior to trial, a Magistrate Judge ordered the government to disclose the whereabouts of its informant, Phillip Posner, which the government refused to do.
- At trial, the court excluded business records Opager offered to contradict Posner's testimony, ruling them inadmissible under F.R.Evid. 608(b).
- A jury found Opager guilty on both counts, and the court sentenced her to fifty-four months imprisonment.
- Opager (appellant) appealed her conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) bar the admission of extrinsic evidence, such as business records, when that evidence is offered to disprove a specific fact material to the defense rather than solely to attack a witness's general character for truthfulness?
Opinions:
Majority - Brown, C.J.
No. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) does not bar the admission of extrinsic evidence offered to contradict a witness's testimony about a material issue. The rule's prohibition on extrinsic evidence of specific conduct applies only when the evidence is introduced for the sole purpose of attacking a witness's general character for truthfulness. Here, the business records were not offered merely to show that Posner had a tendency to lie; they were offered to disprove a specific fact material to Opager's entrapment defense—namely, Posner's claim that he witnessed her dealing drugs in 1974. Because Posner's testimony was the sole evidence of Opager's predisposition, contradicting it was crucial to her defense. Excluding relevant evidence that disproves a material fact would improperly 'divorce legal proceedings from the truth seeking process.' The court also found reversible error in the government's repeated refusal to comply with a court order to disclose Posner's whereabouts, which prejudiced Opager's ability to prepare for trial.
Analysis:
This case establishes a critical limitation on the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b). It clarifies that the rule against using extrinsic evidence for impeachment is aimed at preventing mini-trials on collateral matters of a witness's general character, not at excluding evidence that directly contradicts testimony on a material issue in the case. This decision protects a defendant's ability to present a full defense by ensuring that relevant, contradictory evidence is admissible to challenge key facts asserted by prosecution witnesses. It solidifies the principle that the pursuit of truth regarding material facts can outweigh rules designed to limit character-based impeachment.
Unlock the full brief for United States v. Patricia Lynn Opager