United States v. Ortiz
45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 146, 422 U.S. 891 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourth Amendment requires that Border Patrol officers have probable cause or consent to search a private vehicle at a traffic checkpoint that is not at the border or its functional equivalent.
Facts:
- On November 12, 1973, Border Patrol officers stopped the car driven by Ortiz at a traffic checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 in San Clemente, California.
- The San Clemente checkpoint is located 66 road miles north of the Mexican border.
- The government conceded that the checkpoint was not the functional equivalent of the border.
- The officers had no special reason or probable cause to suspect that Ortiz's car was carrying concealed aliens.
- During the stop, officers searched the trunk of Ortiz's car.
- The search revealed three aliens concealed inside the trunk.
Procedural Posture:
- Ortiz was convicted in a federal trial court on three counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the country illegally.
- Ortiz, as the appellant, appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the search was unconstitutional.
- The United States, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a warrantless search of a private vehicle by the Border Patrol at a fixed traffic checkpoint located a significant distance from the border, conducted without consent or probable cause, violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Powell
Yes. A warrantless vehicle search at a fixed traffic checkpoint away from the border or its functional equivalent, without probable cause or consent, violates the Fourth Amendment. The Court extended its reasoning from Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, which prohibited such searches by roving patrols, to fixed checkpoints. The government argued that checkpoints are less intrusive and give officers less discretion than roving patrols. However, the Court found that while a stop at a checkpoint might be less intrusive, a search is a substantial invasion of privacy regardless of the context. Furthermore, because officers at the San Clemente checkpoint searched fewer than 3% of vehicles, they exercised a substantial degree of discretion, which, without the safeguard of probable cause, creates the risk of arbitrary intrusions forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the requirement of probable cause is necessary to protect privacy from official arbitrariness.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
While acknowledging his dissent in Almeida-Sanchez, he concurred because the majority of the Court still adheres to that precedent. He agreed with the Court's analysis that for the purpose of a full search, there is no meaningful distinction between roving patrols and fixed checkpoints. However, he stressed that the opinion is confined to full searches and should not be read to cast doubt on the constitutionality of routine stops at checkpoints for the limited purpose of inquiring about citizenship, which he views as a modest and reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment.
Concurring - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
He concurred only in the judgment, expressing deep frustration that the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has rendered the government 'powerless to stop the tide of illegal aliens.' He argued that the Court has failed to properly apply the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard by not balancing individual rights against the nation's security needs. He suggested that history may view the Court as 'prisoners of our own traditional and appropriate concern for individual rights,' unable to address massive lawlessness.
Concurring - Mr. Justice White
He concurred in the judgment, stating that the result was 'largely foreordained' by the precedent set in Almeida-Sanchez, with which he disagreed. He opined that the Court's decisions have dismantled key components of the nation's system for intercepting illegal aliens. He concluded that this is a problem of national policy for Congress and the Executive Branch to solve, particularly as long as it remains legal for businesses to employ undocumented aliens, rendering law enforcement efforts minimally effective.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtailed the authority of the Border Patrol by extending the probable cause requirement for warrantless vehicle searches from roving patrols (Almeida-Sanchez) to fixed immigration checkpoints not at the border or its functional equivalent. It established that the nature of a search as a 'substantial invasion of privacy' does not change based on the location of the law enforcement stop. The ruling solidified a critical distinction between brief, suspicionless stops for questioning (which were later upheld in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte) and full-scale searches, which demand the higher standard of probable cause. This case reinforced the principle that discretionary law enforcement actions that intrude on privacy must be checked by objective constitutional standards.
