United States v. Omar Arreguin
735 F.3d 1168, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23506 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
Under the apparent authority doctrine, a third party's consent to search a residence does not extend to specific, private areas like a master bedroom if law enforcement's belief in that authority is not objectively reasonable. Officers have a duty to inquire further when the third party's authority over those specific areas is ambiguous.
Facts:
- On August 16, 2008, nine DEA agents, including John Rubio and Paul McQuay, conducted a 'knock and talk' investigation at the home of Omar Arreguin and his wife, Maria Ledesma-Olivares.
- A houseguest, Elias Valencia, Jr., answered the door looking sleepy.
- From the doorway, agents saw Arreguin holding a shoebox and Ledesma-Olivares holding their infant.
- Agent Rubio asked Valencia, 'Can we come in and look around?' Valencia consented and stepped back, while Arreguin and his wife remained silent.
- As agents entered, Arreguin walked swiftly toward the master bedroom, disappeared from view, and was then called back to the front of the house by the agents.
- While Agent Rubio began speaking with Arreguin, Agent McQuay proceeded into the master bedroom, ostensibly to conduct a 'safety sweep.'
- Inside the master bathroom, McQuay discovered the shoebox Arreguin had been holding, which contained a white powdery substance.
- McQuay then went through a second door inside the master bedroom, entered the garage, and found a bag containing $176,990 in cash.
Procedural Posture:
- Omar Arreguin was indicted in U.S. District Court on drug charges.
- Arreguin filed a motion to suppress evidence found during the search, arguing it was conducted without a warrant or valid consent.
- The district court (trial court) denied the motion to suppress.
- Arreguin entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the court's ruling on his suppression motion.
- Arreguin (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit remanded the case, instructing the district court to determine whether Valencia had apparent authority to consent to the search of the specific areas where evidence was found.
- On remand, the district court again heard evidence and once again denied the suppression motion.
- Arreguin (appellant) appealed the district court's second denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a houseguest's consent for law enforcement to 'look around' a residence provide officers with objectively reasonable apparent authority to conduct a warrantless search of private areas, such as a master bedroom and an adjoining garage, when the officers know nothing about the guest's relationship to the premises or the other occupants?
Opinions:
Majority - Goodwin, Circuit Judge
No. A houseguest's consent to 'look around' does not give law enforcement apparent authority to search private areas like a master bedroom and garage when the officers' belief is not objectively reasonable. The government has the burden of establishing that officers reasonably believed the consenting person had authority over the specific areas searched, not just general access to the home. Here, the agents knew virtually nothing about Valencia's connection to the residence. The mere facts that Valencia answered the door, appeared sleepy, and was present with other adults were insufficient to establish a reasonable belief that he had authority to consent to a search of the master suite. In fact, Arreguin's own actions—moving toward the master bedroom with his property—suggested that he, not Valencia, had control over that private space. When authority is ambiguous, officers cannot proceed on the theory that 'ignorance is bliss'; they must make further inquiry.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the specificity requirement of the apparent authority doctrine in the context of third-party consent searches. It clarifies that a general consent to 'look around' from an individual of unknown status does not grant law enforcement a blank check to search private areas within a home. The ruling places an affirmative duty on officers to inquire into a third party's scope of authority when it is ambiguous, thereby protecting the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of co-habitants against unwarranted intrusions. This precedent limits law enforcement's ability to capitalize on ambiguity during 'knock and talk' encounters and will likely require officers to be more diligent in establishing the basis of consent before searching private spaces.
