United States v. Occhipinti
1993 WL 658950, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20340, 851 F. Supp. 523 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Allegations of judicial bias must be timely and based on specific facts demonstrating personal prejudice from an extrajudicial source; a judge's prior professional relationship with an attorney or dissatisfaction with a judge's in-court rulings are legally insufficient grounds for recusal.
Facts:
- Joseph Occhipinti was a Supervisory Special Agent with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
- Occhipinti was indicted for conducting illegal interrogations and searches, seizing assets for personal profit, and falsifying official reports.
- The Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting the case, Jeh Johnson, had served as a student intern in the chambers of the presiding judge, Judge Motley, for one semester ten years prior to the case.
- Judge Motley had also attended college with Johnson's uncle over fifty years earlier.
- At the first pre-trial conference, prosecutor Johnson fully disclosed on the record his past student internship with Judge Motley and the judge's acquaintance with his uncle.
- Occhipinti's defense counsel at the time acknowledged the disclosure on the record and raised no objection.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted Joseph Occhipinti in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, a federal trial court.
- Following a four-week trial, a jury convicted Occhipinti on charges of conspiring to violate civil rights and making false statements.
- Occhipinti, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Second Circuit, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the conviction.
- President George Bush later commuted Occhipinti's sentence to time served.
- Occhipinti then filed a motion for a new trial in the original trial court (S.D.N.Y.) based on new evidence.
- Along with the motion for a new trial, Occhipinti filed the instant motion for the trial judge to recuse herself and for the case to be transferred to a different district court.
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Issue:
Do a judge's prior professional association with a prosecutor and a party's disagreement with the judge's trial rulings require judicial recusal for personal bias under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, particularly when the recusal motion is filed long after the association was disclosed?
Opinions:
Majority - Motley, District Judge
No. A judge's prior professional association with a prosecutor and a party's disagreement with trial rulings do not require recusal. A motion for recusal must be timely and based on specific facts showing personal bias from an extrajudicial source, not on conduct or rulings made within the judicial context. The court found three key reasons to deny the motion. First, the motion was procedurally defective because it was untimely, having been filed almost two years after the petitioner learned of the judge's association with the prosecutor, and it failed to comply with the strict affidavit and certification requirements of § 144. Second, a judge's former professional association with an attorney, such as a law clerk or student intern, does not in itself constitute grounds for recusal; to hold otherwise would cripple the judiciary, as judges frequently encounter former clerks in court. Third, the petitioner's other allegations of bias were based entirely on the judge's in-court trial rulings, such as excluding evidence and witnesses. The proper remedy for erroneous judicial rulings is an appeal, not a motion for disqualification, as judicial bias must stem from an extrajudicial source.
Analysis:
This opinion reinforces the high threshold for judicial disqualification and the critical distinction between appealable legal error and personal bias. It establishes that a judge's past professional associations, if disclosed, are generally not grounds for recusal, preventing attorneys from strategically 'judge shopping.' The decision also firmly reiterates that a party's disagreement with a judge's rulings during a case cannot be repackaged as evidence of bias; such claims must be handled through the appellate process. This protects judicial independence and prevents parties from attempting to obtain a 'fresh start' with a new judge after receiving unfavorable decisions.
