United States v. Nathan E. Gundy
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21064, 2016 WL 6892164, 842 F.3d 1156 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A state burglary statute that lists alternative locational targets in the disjunctive (e.g., building, vehicle, watercraft) is divisible into separate offenses, allowing a court to apply the modified categorical approach to determine if a prior conviction under that statute qualifies as a generic burglary for the purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
Facts:
- Between 2001 and 2006, Nathan E. Gundy was convicted of seven separate burglary offenses in the state of Georgia.
- Gundy pled guilty to each of these prior offenses.
- The indictments for Gundy's prior burglary convictions specified that he had unlawfully entered either a 'dwelling house' or a 'business house'.
- None of Gundy's prior convictions involved the burglary of a vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, or aircraft.
- Gundy was later found to be in possession of three firearms, which is illegal for a convicted felon.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury in a U.S. District Court found Nathan E. Gundy guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of firearms.
- In a Presentence Investigation Report, the probation officer recommended that Gundy be sentenced as an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on his prior Georgia burglary convictions.
- Gundy objected to the armed career criminal designation, arguing that his prior burglary convictions did not qualify as 'violent felonies' under the ACCA.
- The district court overruled Gundy's objection, designated him an armed career criminal, and sentenced him to 288 months' imprisonment.
- Gundy, as the appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a prior conviction under Georgia’s burglary statute, which criminalizes unlawful entry into both generic locations like buildings and non-generic locations like vehicles and watercraft, qualify as a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s enumerated crimes clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Hull, Circuit Judge
Yes, a prior conviction under Georgia’s burglary statute can qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA. The Georgia statute is divisible because it lists alternative locational elements, and the indictments from the defendant's prior convictions demonstrate he was convicted of generic burglary. The court reasoned that unlike the indivisible statutes in Mathis and Howard, which used a single locational term like 'occupied structure' or 'building' and then defined it in a separate section, the Georgia statute lists multiple, distinct locational elements in the disjunctive within the main text of the crime. Citing Georgia case law like DeFrancis v. Manning, the court found that Georgia treats the specific location of the burglary as an essential element that must be alleged in the indictment. Because the statute is divisible, the modified categorical approach applies. An examination of the Shepard documents (Gundy's indictments) revealed he was convicted of burglarizing 'dwelling houses' and 'business houses,' which are buildings or structures that fall within the generic definition of burglary, thus qualifying them as ACCA predicates.
Dissenting - Pryor, Circuit Judge
No, a prior conviction under Georgia's burglary statute cannot qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA. The statute is indivisible because Georgia law treats the crime of burglary as having a single locational element, and since the statute criminalizes conduct broader than generic burglary, it cannot serve as an ACCA predicate. The dissent argued that Georgia case law, specifically Lloyd v. State, defines burglary with only two essential elements, grouping 'dwelling or building' into a single locational requirement, not separate ones. Therefore, the various locations listed in the statute are merely alternative 'means' of committing the single crime of burglary, not distinct 'elements.' Furthermore, even if state law were ambiguous, a 'peek' at the record of conviction is inconclusive because some of Gundy's indictments used the non-statutory term 'business house,' which cannot be an element. This ambiguity fails to provide the certainty required by Taylor and Mathis to determine that Gundy was convicted of a generic offense.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the Mathis 'elements versus means' test, particularly for statutes that list alternatives within the main criminal provision rather than in a separate definitional section. By holding Georgia's burglary statute divisible, the court significantly impacts federal sentencing for defendants with such priors, making it much more likely they will qualify for the ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. The case underscores the critical role of state-specific procedural law, such as indictment requirements, in the federal divisibility analysis, creating a potential split with other circuits that might interpret similar statutory structures differently.
