United States v. Nathan Driggers
913 F.3d 655 (2019)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A jury instruction on joint possession is proper when there is substantial evidence of joint occupancy and control of the premises where contraband is found. Additionally, a prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories in separate prosecutions does not warrant a new trial if the defendant cannot demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the inconsistency had a prejudicial effect on the jury's verdict.
Facts:
- On April 12, 2015, thieves stole over 100 Ruger firearms from a cargo train in a Chicago railyard.
- According to government witness Marcel Turner, later that day he and another robber, Terry Walker, sold approximately 30 of the stolen guns to Nathan Driggers at Driggers's store.
- Driggers co-leased the store on a month-to-month basis with Yashmine Odom, though Driggers paid most of the rent and made some repairs.
- During a search of the store, police found one of the stolen firearms hidden inside a tire in the backroom.
- Personal documents and mail belonging to both Driggers and Odom were also found in the store.
- In the days following the alleged gun purchase, phone records showed 46 contacts between Driggers and his co-defendant, Warren Gates, whereas there had been zero contacts in the four months prior.
- Police later found six of the stolen guns in Gates's storage units.
- In his own separate case, Gates had stated in a plea agreement that he purchased the stolen guns from two of the original robbers, not from Driggers.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government charged Nathan Driggers in federal district court with being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen firearm.
- Following a trial, a jury returned a split verdict, finding Driggers guilty of being a felon in possession but not guilty of possessing a stolen firearm.
- Driggers, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The United States is the appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a joint-possession jury instruction proper when contraband is found in a location that the defendant jointly controls with another person, even if the prosecution's primary theory is sole possession?
Opinions:
Majority - Wood, Chief Judge
Yes, a joint-possession instruction is proper where there is substantial evidence that more than one person could have possessed the contraband. The court found ample basis for the instruction because Driggers co-leased the store with Odom, personal effects for both men were found on the premises, and testimony indicated both men exercised control over the store. The court noted that such an instruction is 'necessary' when contraband is recovered from a jointly-occupied residence. The court also addressed Driggers's challenge to evidence concerning his co-defendant, Gates, which was based on a prosecutorial theory inconsistent with the one used in Gates's own case. While acknowledging the inconsistency, the court declined to rule on whether this violated due process because Driggers suffered no prejudice. The jury acquitted Driggers of possessing a stolen firearm—the very charge the Gates evidence supported—and his conviction for being a felon in possession could be sustained solely by the single gun found in the jointly-controlled store, which had no connection to the Gates evidence.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high bar for defendants claiming a due process violation based on inconsistent prosecutorial theories. By resolving the issue on prejudice grounds—noting the jury acquitted on the relevant charge—the court sidesteps the existing circuit split and signals that an appellate reversal requires showing a tangible, adverse effect on the verdict, not just the existence of an inconsistency. The ruling also affirms the broad discretion of trial courts to issue a joint possession instruction whenever evidence suggests shared control over a premises, even if it is not the prosecution's main theory. This makes it difficult for defendants in joint-occupancy situations to limit the jury's options to a theory of sole possession.
