United States v. Narciso
446 F. Supp. 252, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12311 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
Cumulative prosecutorial misconduct and persistent discovery abuses, when occurring in a weak and entirely circumstantial case, can prevent a fair trial and thus warrant a new trial in the interest of justice, even if individual errors might not independently justify reversal.
Facts:
- During July and August 1975, 35 patients at the Ann Arbor Veterans Administration Hospital suffered a total of 51 cardiopulmonary arrests.
- An intensive epidemiological and criminal investigation was initiated to determine the cause of these unexpected events.
- Filipina Narciso and Leonora Perez were nurses employed at the Ann Arbor Veterans Administration Hospital during the period of these arrests.
- The government's case against Narciso and Perez was entirely circumstantial, relying on expert testimony about the use of a muscle relaxant drug (pavulon), patient observations, and proving the defendants' exclusive presence during critical time periods.
- The government alleged that Narciso was observed by Mark Hogan's bedside shortly before his respiratory arrest on July 29, 1975.
- The government alleged that Perez was observed by Charles Gasmire's bedside, performing unseen functions with intravenous tubing, approximately one-and-a-half minutes before his respiratory arrest on July 29, 1975.
- On August 15, 1975, three patients (Benny Blaine, John McCrery, and Bill Loesch) suffered respiratory arrests in close proximity, and the government alleged Perez was with Blaine, Narciso with McCrery, and both with Loesch.
- The government also presented testimony suggesting Narciso was in a hallway on the fifth floor, a considerable distance from intravenous solutions, shortly before patient Mr. Fletcher suffered an arrest.
Procedural Posture:
- A Grand Jury in the Eastern District of Michigan returned an indictment (Cr. No. 6-80884) charging Filipina Narciso and Leonora Perez with murder, mingling poison, and conspiracy.
- Defendants filed extensive discovery motions, which the District Court addressed through multiple conferences and orders.
- The District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on December 23, 1976, requiring maximum discovery from the government, including FBI 302 forms, statements made to third parties, and a list of overt acts the government intended to prove.
- The government failed to meet various discovery deadlines, provided incomplete and redacted `Brady` material, and was found to have made "purposeful, but not malicious" deletions of exculpatory evidence from FBI 302 forms.
- Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on alleged governmental misconduct, including discovery abuses, `Brady` violations, and improper grand jury proceedings.
- The District Court denied the motion to dismiss but issued an order on January 14, 1977, compelling further discovery and prohibiting the government from proving any respiratory arrests not delineated in the original indictment.
- On January 31, 1977, the government obtained a superseding indictment (Cr. No. 7-80149) that included three respiratory arrests as overt acts not present in the original indictment.
- Defendants moved to strike these newly added overt acts, which the District Court granted, finding them an attempt to evade prior court orders.
- Defendants moved to suppress Richard Neely's identification testimony due to concerns about hypnotic interrogation and suggestive photographic arrays; this motion was denied.
- Defendants moved to suppress John McCrery's 'PIA' note as inadmissible hearsay; this motion was granted.
- A jury trial lasting almost three months was held.
- The jury returned verdicts finding both defendants guilty of conspiracy; Narciso guilty of the poisoning of Mark Hogan, John McCrery, and William Loesch; and Perez guilty of the poisoning of Charles Gasmire, Benny Blaine, and William Loesch.
- The jury acquitted Narciso of the poisoning of Mr. Fletcher and the murder of John Herman.
- Defendants Filipina Narciso and Leonora Perez filed a Motion for New Trial following their convictions.
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Issue:
Does the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct, including discovery violations, improper extra-judicial statements, and improper arguments to the jury, in a weak, circumstantial criminal case, so prejudice the defendants as to warrant a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33?
Opinions:
Majority - Philip Pratt
Yes, the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct in this case prevented the defendants from receiving a fair trial and warrants a new trial in the interest of justice. The court found that the government’s conduct, from pre-trial discovery through closing arguments, consistently undermined the defendants' ability to prepare and receive a fair hearing, particularly given the weak and entirely circumstantial nature of the prosecution's case. Pre-trial, the government engaged in persistent discovery abuses, including late and incomplete disclosures, redacting exculpatory `Brady` material in FBI 302 forms (which the court characterized as "purposeful, but not malicious"), and consistently changing its witness lists, which kept the defense "continually off-balance." The government also evaded court orders, such as by seeking a superseding indictment with overt acts previously prohibited by court order and sending an improper letter to witnesses that discouraged them from speaking with defense counsel. During the trial, an Assistant U.S. Attorney made an extra-judicial statement to the press declaring the defendants guilty, violating professional standards and Department of Justice rules. In cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly asked defendant Narciso if other witnesses were "lying," a tactic the court sustained objections to but which continued. Finally, in closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly implied the existence of unpresented evidence, suggested the defense had a duty to prove innocence, and, most egregiously, invited the jury to combine all 43 factual reasons for guilt into a "44th reason" of cumulative probability, directly conflicting with the court's instructions to consider each charge separately and diluting the presumption of innocence. While no single error might have independently required reversal, the court concluded that the "insidious accretion" of these improprieties, coupled with the government's weak, circumstantial case (as evidenced by partial acquittals), "polluted the waters of justice" and reasonably affected the jury's deliberations, making a fair and impartial verdict impossible. The court emphasized its duty to safeguard the integrity of the jury trial and ensure fundamental fairness.
Analysis:
This case serves as a crucial precedent highlighting that prosecutorial misconduct is not assessed in a vacuum; a pattern of abuses, even if individually minor, can collectively violate due process and necessitate a new trial. It reinforces the broad discretion of trial courts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to intervene "in the interest of justice" when the integrity of the judicial process is compromised. The ruling underscores the high ethical standards expected of prosecutors and the fundamental right of defendants to adequate trial preparation and a trial free from improper influence, especially when the evidence against them is circumstantial. It warns against a "trial by ambush" mentality and emphasizes that the fairness of the trial process is as important as the eventual outcome.
