United States v. Myers
550 F.2d 1036 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1, the government has a mandatory and continuing duty to disclose in writing all witnesses it intends to use to rebut a defendant's alibi defense. Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes is only admissible to prove identity if the charged and uncharged offenses share features that are so unique and distinctive as to constitute a signature modus operandi.
Facts:
- On June 13, 1974, a lone gunman robbed a bank in Clearwater, Florida.
- Larry Allen Myers was charged with the robbery, but his friend Dennis Coffie, who bore a remarkable physical resemblance to Myers, pled guilty to being the lone gunman.
- Myers asserted an alibi defense, claiming he was at Disneyworld, approximately 80 miles from the robbery, on the afternoon it occurred.
- Myers' primary alibi witness, Ronald Akers, testified that he and Myers spent the entire afternoon together at Disneyworld.
- Akers testified he was certain of the date because he drove two girls they were with to the airport for a flight on Saturday, June 15, 1974.
- On July 29, 1974, Myers was involved in a separate armed bank robbery in Warren, Pennsylvania, with Coffie.
- Myers allegedly fled from FBI agents in a Florida shopping mall several weeks after the Florida robbery and was later arrested with Coffie in California.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury charged Larry Allen Myers with federal bank robbery in the U.S. District Court.
- Prior to the first trial, the government filed a demand for notice of alibi defense pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1, to which Myers responded with a list of his alibi witnesses.
- The government provided a list of witnesses who would place Myers at the scene of the crime.
- Myers' first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
- At the second trial, the government presented testimony from four witnesses who were not on its pre-trial witness list to rebut the credibility of Myers' alibi witness.
- The district court denied Myers' motion to strike the testimony of the undisclosed witnesses.
- The district court also admitted evidence of Myers' prior conviction for a separate bank robbery and gave the jury a flight instruction.
- A second jury found Myers guilty, and the district court sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment.
- Myers appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the government violate its disclosure obligations under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1 by failing to provide the defense with a written list of witnesses it intends to use solely to rebut the credibility of a defendant's alibi witness?
Opinions:
Majority - Clark, J.
Yes. The government violates its disclosure obligations by failing to provide a written list of its alibi rebuttal witnesses. Rule 12.1(b) unambiguously requires the government to disclose not only witnesses who place the defendant at the scene of the crime but also 'any other witnesses to be relied on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant’s alibi witnesses.' The government's failure to disclose the four witnesses it used to discredit Myers' alibi witness, Akers, constituted a violation of this rule, and the district court abused its discretion by refusing to strike their testimony. The legislative history confirms Congress intended the rule to prevent unfair surprise and allow the defense to fully evaluate its alibi strategy. The court also identified two other reversible errors. First, the admission of Myers' subsequent Pennsylvania bank robbery conviction under Rule 404(b) was improper. The similarities between the two robberies—time of day, location near a highway, use of revolvers and stocking masks—were common components of bank robberies and did not constitute a unique 'signature' modus operandi necessary to prove identity. The substantial prejudicial effect of this evidence far outweighed its minimal probative value. Second, the jury instruction on flight was given in error because the evidence did not adequately support it. For the alleged flight in California, the agent's testimony was contradictory and inconclusive. For the alleged flight in Florida, it was not immediate enough to the crime, and it could have been motivated by consciousness of guilt for the Pennsylvania robbery, not the charged offense.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strictness of the government's reciprocal discovery obligations under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1, preventing prosecutors from using undisclosed 'surprise' witnesses to ambush an alibi defense. The case also significantly clarifies the high standard for admitting 'other crimes' evidence under Rule 404(b) to prove identity, demanding that the similarities be truly unique and distinctive, not merely generic features of a certain crime type. This raises the bar for prosecutors seeking to introduce such highly prejudicial evidence and strengthens the defendant's right to be tried solely for the charged offense based on relevant, non-propensity evidence.
