Yes, Congress overstepped its power. Congress can only regulate 'commerce,' which means business and economic stuff. Violent crime is not a business. If the Court let Congress regulate anything that has an economic side effect, it would give Congress the power to regulate almost everything, like marriage and local schools, which is a power reserved for the states. Also, the 14th Amendment lets Congress fix problems caused by state governments, not private people. This law tries to punish the attackers (private citizens), not the state, so it's not a valid use of that power.

Yes. I agree with the main opinion, but I think the problem is even bigger. The whole idea that Congress can regulate things just because they have a 'substantial effect' on the economy is wrong and has let the federal government become way too powerful.

No, the law should be upheld. The Court is ignoring years of its own decisions. Congress did a lot of research and found tons of evidence showing that violence against women seriously hurts the national economy by preventing women from working, traveling, and shopping. The Court is wrongly bringing back old, rejected ideas to limit Congress's power. Besides, the states themselves asked for this federal law because they were having trouble solving the problem on their own.

No, the law is constitutional. The majority's distinction between 'economic' and 'non-economic' things is confusing and doesn't make sense. In today's world, almost everything is connected and can affect the economy. It should be up to Congress, which is elected by the people, not the courts, to decide where to draw the line. Also, the law could be seen as a fix for the states' failure to protect women, which is a problem Congress can address under the 14th Amendment.

No, Congress can't make this law. Violent crimes based on gender are not business or economic activity, and the law doesn't show how these crimes are related to business between states. The Constitution says crimes that happen in a state are usually the state's job to handle, not the national government's job.

I agree with the main opinion. I think the idea that Congress can make laws about anything that has a big effect on business between states doesn't fit with the original meaning of the Constitution.

Congress had lots of evidence to show that gender-based violence does affect business between states. The courts should respect Congress's judgment if its conclusion was reasonable, and let the political process handle concerns about the balance of power between the national and state governments.

I agree with Justice Souter. The Constitution doesn't require the distinctions the majority opinion makes, and Congress should have the main job of deciding the right balance of power, not the courts.

No, the national government does not have the power to make a law that lets victims of violent crimes sue their attackers in national court if the crime was motivated by the victim's gender. Violent crimes based on gender are not business or economic activity, and the law doesn't show how these crimes are related to business between states. The Constitution says crimes that happen in a state are usually the state's job to handle, not the national government's job.

Yes, the national government has the power to make a law that lets victims of violent crimes sue their attackers in national court if the crime was motivated by the victim's gender. Congress had lots of evidence to show that gender-based violence does affect business between states. The courts should respect Congress's judgment if its conclusion was reasonable, and let the political process handle concerns about the balance of power between the national and state governments.

Yes, I agree with Justice Souter that the national government has the power to make a law that lets victims of violent crimes sue their attackers in national court if the crime was motivated by the victim's gender. The Constitution doesn't require the distinctions the majority opinion makes, and Congress should have the main job of deciding the right balance of power, not the courts.

The Violence Against Women Act had no jurisdictional provision requiring case-by-case proof of a sufficient interstate commerce nexus.

The Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate "those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce

In striking down the VAWA, the Court found that "gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity," and that the statute lacked a jurisdictional element "establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce."

—holding that Congress lacked power to enact civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against Women Act under either the Commerce Clause or section five of the fourteenth amendment

—striking down the Violence Against Women Act which provided a federal civil remedy to victims of "violence motivated by gender

—reject [ing] the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce

Nevertheless, "[d] ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds."

The Fourteenth Amendment, thus "by its very terms" applies only to state, rather than federal, action.

Because the application of the VRA to felon-disenfranchisement statutes would not be a response to specific, identified, unconstitutional wrongdoing, it cannot be congruent and proportional.[6] Legislation unsupported by a record indicating the need for remedial measures consistently has been held to be "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object …

Without enforcing the limits imposed by the Constitution, according to the Court in Morrison, "the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority seems well founded."

Yes, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 exceeds Congress's constitutional authority. With respect to the Commerce Clause, the Court, following the framework of United States v. Lopez, found that gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity. Regulating such crimes based on an attenuated, 'but-for' causal chain of their aggregate effects on the national economy would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local, effectively giving Congress a general police power. The statute also lacks a jurisdictional element linking the specific act of violence to interstate commerce. Regarding Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that its enforcement power is limited to remedying state action, not private conduct, as established in the Civil Rights Cases. Because § 13981 is directed at private individuals rather than state officials, it is an unconstitutional exercise of § 5 power. The remedy is also not 'congruent and proportional' to the harm of state bias, as it punishes the private perpetrator rather than correcting the state's failure.

Yes. While joining the majority opinion in full, this concurrence expresses the view that the 'substantial effects' test itself is inconsistent with the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. By continuing to apply this malleable standard, the Court encourages Congress to continue appropriating state police powers. The Court should replace its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more faithful to the original meaning of the Constitution.

No. The Court departs from decades of settled Commerce Clause precedent by substituting its judgment for that of Congress. The correct standard is whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the activity, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. Congress had amassed a 'mountain of data' demonstrating the serious economic impact of gender-motivated violence, a record far more substantial than that in cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel. The majority's revival of a distinction between economic and non-economic activity is a return to a failed, formalistic approach from the pre-1937 era. Furthermore, concerns about federalism are misplaced, as 38 state attorneys general supported the law, acknowledging the inadequacy of state remedies and the need for federal action.

No. The majority's 'economic/noneconomic' distinction is difficult to apply and creates arbitrary results, as Congress can often redraft laws to include a jurisdictional hook and evade the limitation. The practical reality of a modern, interconnected nation is that virtually all aggregated local activity can affect interstate commerce, making it the role of the political process, not the courts, to strike the appropriate federal-state balance. Regarding Section 5, the majority's reasoning is doubtful because the law can be understood as a remedy for the documented failure of state actors to provide adequate legal protection, which is a form of state action that Congress is empowered to address.

No, neither the Commerce Clause nor Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grant Congress the power to enact § 13981. Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity, and the statute contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local, and the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims has always been the province of the States.

I join the majority opinion in full but write separately to express my view that the very notion of a "substantial effects" test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress' powers and with this Court's early Commerce Clause cases. By continuing to apply this rootless and malleable standard, the Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.

The business of the courts is to review the congressional assessment of the impact on commerce, not for soundness but simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in fact. Congress had a mountain of evidence from which it rationally could conclude that gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce. The Court's concerns about federalism should be addressed through the political process, not by unjustified judicial limits on the commerce power.

I agree with Justice Souter's analysis of the Commerce Clause issue and join his dissent. I add that the majority's "economic/noneconomic" and "traditional state regulation" distinctions are not required by the Constitution and will likely prove unworkable in practice. Congress, not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate federal/state balance.

Yes, Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to enact § 13981. The business of the courts is to review the congressional assessment of the impact on commerce, not for soundness but simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in fact. Congress had a mountain of evidence from which it rationally could conclude that gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce. The Court's concerns about federalism should be addressed through the political process, not by unjustified judicial limits on the commerce power.

Yes, Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to enact § 13981. I agree with Justice Souter's analysis of the Commerce Clause issue and join his dissent. I add that the majority's "economic/noneconomic" and "traditional state regulation" distinctions are not required by the Constitution and will likely prove unworkable in practice. Congress, not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate federal/state balance.

United States v. Morrison

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