United States v. Morales
272 F.3d 284, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23872, 2001 WL 1355343 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A communication transmitted in interstate commerce constitutes a 'true threat' under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if, in its context, it would cause a reasonable person to apprehend that the originator will act on it. The statute requires only general intent, meaning the government does not need to prove the defendant subjectively intended to threaten, and the threat is actionable even if communicated to a third party rather than the intended victim.
Facts:
- Eduardo Morales, an 18-year-old student at Milby High School in Houston, Texas, entered an internet chatroom.
- Using an instant messenger, Morales began a private conversation with Crystal Lees, a woman in Washington whom he did not know.
- Morales told Lees that he was tired and was going to kill teachers and students at Milby High School.
- When asked if he was serious, Morales replied, "YES F NE ONE STANDS N MY WAY WILL SHOT."
- During the exchange, Morales falsely identified himself as "ED HARRIS," an apparent reference to Eric Harris, one of the perpetrators of the Columbine High School massacre.
- Lees became concerned and alerted the police.
- As a result of the threat, the principal of Milby High School increased security measures on campus.
- When confronted by police, Morales admitted to sending the messages but insisted he was only joking to see how Lees would react.
Procedural Posture:
- Eduardo Morales was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
- Morales filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds, which the trial court denied.
- During the jury trial, Morales moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing his statements were not a 'true threat.' The trial court denied the motion.
- The trial court rejected Morales's proposed jury instructions, which would have required the government to prove he subjectively intended to make a threat.
- A jury found Morales guilty of the charge.
- The trial court denied Morales’s post-verdict motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial.
- Morales (appellant) appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions, against the United States (appellee).
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Issue:
Does a communication sent via the internet to a third party in another state constitute a 'true threat' under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) based on an objective standard of whether it would create reasonable apprehension, regardless of the sender's subjective intent or the fact that it was not sent directly to the target of the threat?
Opinions:
Majority - E. Grady Jolly
Yes, a communication sent to a third party constitutes a 'true threat' under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if it meets an objective standard of creating reasonable apprehension, regardless of the sender's subjective intent. The court's reasoning follows from its precedent in United States v. Myers. The test for a 'true threat' is whether the communication 'in its context would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.' This is an objective standard that does not require the government to prove the defendant subjectively intended to make a threat. Section 875(c) is a general intent crime, meaning the prosecution only needs to show the defendant comprehended the meaning of their words and uttered them voluntarily, which Morales did. Furthermore, the statute's plain text does not require the threat to be communicated directly to the intended victim, and precedent confirms that threats made to third parties are prosecutable. Given the context, including Morales's reference to the Columbine shooting and Lees's genuine fear, a reasonable jury could find that the statements constituted a true threat.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of an objective test for determining a 'true threat' under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), particularly in the context of internet communications. By affirming that only general intent is required, the court lowers the evidentiary burden for the prosecution, making it easier to convict individuals who make threatening statements online, even if they later claim to be joking. The ruling is significant for its confirmation that threats communicated to third parties are as illegal as those sent directly to the target, reflecting the reality of how threats can spread in the digital age and cause widespread fear. This precedent broadens the scope of prosecutable online speech and underscores that the perceived impact on a reasonable listener is more important than the speaker's unstated intent.
