United States v. Moore
486 F.2d 1139 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's status as a narcotics addict does not constitute an involuntary condition that would serve as a common law or constitutional defense to a criminal charge of possessing narcotics for personal use.
Facts:
- In January 1970, Metropolitan Police began an investigation into a heroin trafficking operation being conducted out of two rooms in a Washington, D.C. hotel.
- An informant, under police supervision, made heroin purchases from individuals identified as "Crip Green" and "Jumbo" in the targeted hotel rooms.
- Based on this information, police obtained and executed search warrants for the two rooms on January 29, 1970.
- Upon entering one room, police found Raymond Moore and Sherman Beverly seated in chairs facing a bed.
- On the bed was a large quantity of heroin, along with extensive paraphernalia used for diluting, measuring, and packaging heroin for street sale, including mirrors, capsules, syringes, and a cutting screen.
- A search of Moore revealed a plastic vial in his trouser pocket containing 50 capsules of heroin.
- Moore stipulated that he was a long-time heroin addict and testified that he had come to the hotel room only to purchase the 50 capsules found in his pocket for his personal use.
Procedural Posture:
- Raymond Moore was charged in a four-count indictment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia with violations of the Harrison Narcotics Act and the Jones-Miller Act.
- Before trial, Moore moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that as a non-trafficking addict, he could not be held criminally responsible for possession.
- The district court denied the motion to dismiss.
- During the trial, the court ruled that expert testimony regarding Moore's addiction and resulting lack of control was inadmissible on the question of guilt.
- The jury found Moore guilty on all four counts.
- The court then committed Moore for an examination under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA).
- After the NARA staff reported Moore was an addict but unsuitable for treatment, the district court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms.
- Moore appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which heard the case en banc.
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Issue:
Does a heroin addict's alleged lack of self-control due to addiction create a common law or constitutional defense under the Eighth Amendment to a criminal charge of possessing heroin?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilkey, J.
No. A heroin addict's alleged lack of self-control due to addiction does not create a common law or constitutional defense to a charge of possessing heroin. The common law defense of compulsion is logically untenable here, as it cannot be rationally limited to the crime of possession while excluding other crimes, such as robbery, that an addict might commit to obtain drugs. Furthermore, neither the Eighth Amendment nor congressional intent supports such a defense. The Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California only prohibits punishing the 'status' of being an addict, not the 'act' of possessing narcotics. Powell v. Texas reinforced this distinction by upholding a conviction for the act of being drunk in public, not the status of being an alcoholic. Finally, Congress has legislated extensively in the area of narcotics control without ever creating an exemption for addict-possessors; in fact, its legislative history and the text of various statutes, including the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, demonstrate an intent to hold drug users criminally responsible for possession, while providing for treatment at the dispositional stage.
Concurring - Leventhal, J.
No. A judicially-created addiction defense is inappropriate at this time because of the uncertain state of knowledge concerning narcotic addiction and the active role Congress has taken in addressing the problem. While courts in the 1950s might have been compelled to act in the face of rigid and harsh mandatory sentences, the modern legislative approach, including the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA) and the probation-with-treatment options in the 1970 Act, provides the necessary flexibility. The ultimate resolution of this complex policy issue should be left to the legislature, which can better weigh the competing interests and is engaged in ongoing reexamination. The proper judicial role is to focus on ensuring just dispositions and treatment possibilities for addicts within the existing criminal justice framework, rather than to negate their criminal responsibility for the act of possession.
Dissenting - Wright, J.
Yes. A drug addict who, by reason of his addiction, lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the law may not be held criminally responsible for mere possession of drugs for his own use. This conclusion is compelled by the evolution of the common law doctrine of mens rea, which requires a 'free will' for criminal culpability. Addiction is a disease that can destroy self-control, making possession an involuntary act symptomatic of that disease, analogous to this court's holding in Easter v. District of Columbia regarding chronic alcoholism. Furthermore, punishing a non-trafficking addict for possession, an act inseparable from his illness, raises grave Eighth Amendment questions under the principles of Robinson v. California and the views of five justices in Powell v. Texas. The goals of penology are not served by criminally stigmatizing the sick; treatment is the only just and effective response.
Analysis:
This landmark en banc decision firmly rejected the creation of an addiction-based defense to drug possession, establishing a critical precedent in the D.C. Circuit. The court drew a sharp distinction between the 'status' of being an addict, which cannot be criminalized under Robinson v. California, and the 'act' of possession, which can. By deferring to Congress, the court signaled a preference for handling addiction as a medical and social problem at the sentencing and dispositional stages of the criminal process, rather than exculpating addicts at the guilt-determination stage. This ruling solidified a significant barrier for defendants seeking to argue that their drug-related crimes are involuntary symptoms of a disease, forcing such arguments into the more restrictive framework of the insanity defense.
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