United States v. Millet
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 28901, 2007 WL 4355359, 510 F.3d 668 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment if they fail to present evidence showing a lack of predisposition to commit the crime, regardless of government inducement.
Facts:
- Christopher Millet, an attorney with a heroin addiction, regularly purchased drugs from Harvey Gooden.
- In 2003, Gooden was arrested on federal charges and agreed to work as a government informant.
- Gooden informed the FBI that Millet had a scheme to rob drug dealers of cash and had invited Gooden to participate.
- On August 3, 2004, Gooden, acting as an informant and wearing a recording device, proposed that he and Millet rob a fictitious drug dealer who would have a large quantity of cocaine and marijuana.
- Millet immediately agreed to participate in the robbery and suggested using his police contacts to assist in the crime.
- In a subsequent conversation, Millet expressed a preference for stealing the dealer's cash proceeds, but agreed that any drugs recovered would belong to Gooden to sell, acknowledging that the drugs were also 'fast money.'
- Millet recruited at least three other individuals, including a police officer, to execute the robbery, which was planned based on information provided by Gooden.
- After the staged robbery, where Millet's associates stole a bag containing fake cocaine and cash, Gooden told Millet he was being threatened and asked for a gun, which Millet provided.
Procedural Posture:
- Christopher Millet was charged in a federal district court with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, attempting to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and knowingly disposing of a firearm to a known felon.
- At the jury instructions conference during trial, Millet requested an entrapment instruction on all three counts.
- The district court granted the entrapment instruction only for the firearm charge, denying it for the two drug distribution counts.
- The jury convicted Millet on the two drug distribution counts and acquitted him on the firearm charge.
- The district court denied Millet's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to 97 months in prison.
- Millet, as Defendant-Appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while the government, as cross-appellant, appealed the court's sentencing calculation.
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Issue:
Is a defendant entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment when the evidence demonstrates the defendant's predisposition to commit the charged crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Williams, Circuit Judge
No. A defendant is not entitled to an entrapment instruction without showing a lack of predisposition to commit the crime. The defense of entrapment requires evidence of both government inducement and the defendant's lack of predisposition. Here, the court focused on Millet's predisposition, applying a five-factor test where the most important factor is the defendant's reluctance. The record shows Millet was not reluctant; he 'jumped at the opportunity' to join the robbery conspiracy. While he preferred stealing cash, he readily agreed that any recovered drugs would go to Gooden, demonstrating he was 'undisturbed by the notion that Gooden might include drugs in his take.' The government's actions, such as suggesting a large score, did not constitute extraordinary inducement sufficient to corrupt an otherwise innocent person, especially since Millet had a history of robbing drug dealers. Because Millet failed to produce evidence showing he was not predisposed to commit the drug crimes, the district court correctly denied his request for an entrapment instruction on those counts.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the principle that the entrapment defense is unavailable to the 'unwary criminal' and is reserved for the 'unwary innocent.' It solidifies the high evidentiary bar a defendant must clear to even receive an entrapment instruction, emphasizing that the defendant's predisposition is the key inquiry. The court's focus on the 'reluctance' factor provides a clear signal that a defendant's immediate and eager agreement to a criminal proposal will almost always defeat an entrapment claim. This decision makes it more difficult for defendants who are already engaged in a criminal lifestyle to argue they were entrapped when a government sting operation presents them with an opportunity to commit a similar, or even grander, crime.
