United States v. Miguel Angel Ramos-Saenz
1994 WL 495328, 36 F.3d 59 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
Routine border searches, which do not require reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, encompass minimally intrusive acts like removing shoes, even after an initial customs clearance, so long as the search occurs within the functional equivalent of the border.
Facts:
- Miguel Angel Ramos-Saenz arrived at Los Angeles International Airport on a direct flight from Guadalajara, Mexico.
- In the customs area, Senior Customs Inspector Charles Carlson stopped Ramos-Saenz after noticing his bright, white tennis shoes.
- Inspector Carlson wrote on Ramos-Saenz’ declaration card that his shoes should be checked at the secondary customs inspection area.
- Ramos-Saenz proceeded to the secondary inspection area where Inspector William Allen Owens performed a cursory check of Ramos-Saenz but did not search his shoes.
- Inspector Owens signed Ramos-Saenz’ customs declaration, indicating that he had been checked.
- As Ramos-Saenz walked toward the customs area exit, Inspector Carlson again noticed him and called for him to stop.
- Inspectors Carlson and Gerald Niemeyer then showed Ramos-Saenz to a private inspection room and asked him to remove his shoes.
- The Inspectors discovered approximately 526 grams of heroin hidden within the soles of the shoes Ramos-Saenz was wearing, as well as in a pair of shoes he carried in his bag.
Procedural Posture:
- On August 6, 1993, Ramos-Saenz was charged with importation of and possession with intent to distribute heroin.
- Ramos-Saenz filed a motion to suppress the heroin found in both pairs of shoes, arguing that the search and seizure at the airport were unreasonable.
- The district court concluded that the Customs Inspectors violated Ramos-Saenz’ Fourth Amendment rights and granted the motion to suppress the evidence.
- The government appealed the district court's decision.
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Issue:
Does the search of an individual’s shoes immediately after clearing airport customs constitute a routine border search, thereby requiring no reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge
Yes, the search of an individual’s shoes immediately after clearing airport customs is a routine border search and requires no reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned that routine searches at a United States international border require no objective justification, probable cause, or warrant. The key factor in distinguishing routine from non-routine searches is the degree of intrusiveness. The court noted that its past decisions, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, indicate that a search becomes non-routine only when it reaches the degree of intrusiveness present in strip searches or body cavity searches, which require at least reasonable suspicion. Border searches involving the removal of shoes do not involve such a degree of intrusiveness. Furthermore, the court held that functional equivalent border searches may occur after an individual has initially cleared customs, provided they remain within the functional equivalent of the border, as Ramos-Saenz had not even left the customs checkpoint area. Therefore, the search of Ramos-Saenz’ shoes was a routine border search requiring no justification.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the permissible scope of routine border searches, particularly regarding the timing and intrusiveness of searches conducted after an initial customs clearance. It reaffirms that the degree of invasiveness, rather than the act of preliminary clearance, determines whether reasonable suspicion is required. The ruling provides customs officials with broad authority to conduct secondary searches, even after a traveler has ostensibly cleared customs, as long as the search remains minimally intrusive and occurs within the functional equivalent of the border, thereby making it harder for individuals to argue Fourth Amendment violations for such searches.
