United States v. Michael Murray
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40, 46 Fed. R. Serv. 223, 103 F.3d 310 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's character or propensity to commit the charged crime, unless relevant for another permissible purpose (like motive or identity) and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness's conduct to bolster credibility.
Facts:
- Michael Murray ("Solo"), Jonathan Ray Bradley ("Fresh"), and Emanuel Harrison ("Paradise") were allegedly involved in a drug distribution Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) based in Harrisburg.
- Juan Carlos Bacallo worked as a street-level dealer for Bradley's drug ring and owed Bradley money for fronted drugs.
- A week before his murder, Bacallo approached Bradley to inform him that he was quitting the drug business, and Bradley responded by pointing a sawed-off shotgun at Bacallo’s head and telling him that “once you are in this business, you never get out.”
- On the night of January 28, 1992, at a bar, Bradley and Murray repeatedly "smacked" Bacallo.
- Bacallo, Murray, and Harrison left the bar and got into a taxicab driven by Richard Brown, a friend of Murray's.
- Brown drove Bacallo, Murray, and Harrison to a deserted part of State Farm Road in Susquehanna Township at Murray's direction.
- Murray told Bacallo to get out of the car, and shortly after Murray and Bacallo walked away, Brown heard gunshots.
- A few seconds later, Murray got back into the car, carrying a .45 caliber pistol, and said something to the effect of “that is what someone gets for being in violation.”
- Jemeke Stakes testified that in August 1991, in New York City, Murray, alongside Bradley, shot and killed a man named Jorge Tesis over a drug territory dispute, and Bradley “sprayed the building” with gunfire during the incident.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Murray was indicted and arrested in August 1992 on charges including intentional killing in furtherance of a CCE, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and distribution/possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
- In August 1993, the government filed notice that it would seek the death penalty against Murray.
- In June 1994, Murray, Bradley, and Harrison entered guilty pleas as part of an agreement, which for Murray, allowed withdrawal if his offense level was calculated higher than 40.
- The district court judge held Murray's offense level would be 43 due to a failure to show remorse, which would require a life sentence.
- Murray moved to withdraw his plea, and the district court granted the motion.
- The Attorney General subsequently withdrew the death penalty authorization for Murray.
- Murray was tried before a jury.
- During the trial, the district court admitted testimony from Jemeke Stakes concerning an uncharged murder in New York City.
- The district court also admitted testimony from Lt. John Goshert to support the credibility of witness Richard Brown, detailing specific instances of Brown's success as an informant.
- The jury convicted Murray on all counts, including the murder charge and the drug charges.
- A sentence of life imprisonment was imposed.
- Murray appealed his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of an uncharged murder under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 403, and by admitting extrinsic evidence of specific instances of an informant's successful cooperation to bolster credibility under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b), thereby warranting reversal of the murder conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Alito, Circuit Judge
Yes, the district court erred by improperly admitting testimony about an uncharged murder under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403, and by admitting extrinsic evidence of specific instances of an informant's conduct to bolster credibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), which requires reversal of the murder conviction but not the drug convictions. Regarding the uncharged New York murder, the court determined that the government failed to provide a clear, non-propensity basis for its admission. The New York murder was not shown to be related to the Harrisburg CCE, nor did its circumstances (daytime, public, two gunmen, numerous bystanders) sufficiently mirror the Bacallo murder (nighttime, secluded, one gunman, no innocent bystanders) to establish a unique "signature" for identity or a common plan. Even if marginally relevant under Rule 404(b), the evidence's immense danger of unfair prejudice (informing the jury the defendant committed another prior murder) substantially outweighed its slight probative value under Rule 403, particularly given the district court's minimal on-record explanation for its balancing. The court found this error was not harmless for the murder conviction, especially considering the prosecutor's emphasis on it to suggest Murray was "a killer" and the potentially weak eyewitness testimony. Regarding the informant's credibility, while defense cross-examination of Richard Brown attacked his truthfulness, allowing opinion testimony about his reliability, Rule 608(b) prohibits using extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct to support credibility. Lt. Goshert's testimony that Brown "made" "in excess of 65" cases was deemed too specific and constituted improper extrinsic evidence. This error was also not harmless for the murder conviction, as the government heavily emphasized it in closing arguments to bolster Brown's credibility without a curative instruction. The court affirmed the drug convictions, finding these errors harmless due to stronger evidence supporting those charges.
Analysis:
This case highlights the stringent requirements for admitting 'other acts' evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and the necessity of on-the-record Rule 403 balancing, particularly when the evidence is highly prejudicial, such as a prior murder. It reinforces that relevance must be clearly articulated and tied to a permissible purpose other than propensity. Furthermore, the decision underscores the strict prohibition under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) against bolstering a witness's credibility with extrinsic evidence of specific successful instances, even after their truthfulness has been attacked. These rulings protect defendants from unfair prejudice, ensuring that convictions are based on evidence directly related to the charged crime rather than character assassination or improperly enhanced testimony.
