United States v. Michael Edward Lebrun
363 F.3d 715, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6910, 2004 WL 768860 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
A person is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes only if there is a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest, judged by objective circumstances. A confession is involuntary only if it was extracted by threats, violence, or promises sufficient to overbear the defendant's will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination, considering the totality of the circumstances.
Facts:
- In 1968, Michael LeBrun served as disbursing clerk and Ensign Andrew Muns served as disbursing officer aboard the U.S.S. Cacapon.
- On January 16 or 17, 1968, Ensign Muns disappeared while the U.S.S. Cacapon was moored in Subic Bay, and the Navy concluded Muns had stolen $8600 and deserted.
- Thirty years later, Muns’ sister convinced Special Agent Peter Hughes of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Cold Case Homicide Unit to reopen the investigation.
- In the fall of 1999, NCIS agents conducted four interviews with LeBrun, who voluntarily cooperated and, on three occasions, received Miranda warnings.
- On September 21, 2000, NCIS Special Agent Early and Corporal Hunter arrived unexpectedly at LeBrun’s workplace and requested he accompany them to the Missouri Highway Patrol office for an interview, which LeBrun agreed to, thinking it was about his employer.
- Before entering the patrol office, Agent Early told LeBrun he was not under arrest, was free to terminate the interview at any time, and was free to leave.
- Inside a windowless interview room adorned with enlarged photographs of scenes from LeBrun's life, NCIS Agents Early and Grebas initiated the interview without reciting Miranda warnings.
- After approximately 33 minutes of questioning, during which agents used psychological ploys (e.g., stating he was the prime suspect, they had significant evidence, a trial would ruin his finances/reputation), LeBrun confessed to strangling Ensign Muns during a robbery and disposing of the body and money.
- After confessing, LeBrun acknowledged responsibility and apologized to Muns' sister and an agent posing as Muns' brother, then consented to a search of his home, and was driven home by agents without being arrested that day.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael LeBrun was arrested and charged with felony murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
- LeBrun moved to suppress his confession in the district court (federal trial court), arguing it was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona and his due process rights.
- The district court granted LeBrun's motion to suppress, concluding he was 'in custody' for Miranda purposes or, alternatively, that his confession was coerced.
- The government appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
- The government petitioned for a rehearing en banc (a hearing before the full court of appeals).
- The Eighth Circuit granted the government's petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel opinion.
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Issue:
Does a person's confession made during a police interview, where they are told they are not under arrest and are free to leave, and where agents use psychological ploys and make statements that the suspect mistakenly believes are promises of non-prosecution, violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination or due process rights because the person was 'in custody' or the confession was coerced?
Opinions:
Majority - Hansen, Circuit Judge
No, Michael LeBrun's confession was not obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or his due process rights because he was not 'in custody' for Miranda purposes, and his confession was not coerced. The court applies de novo review to 'in custody' determinations, upholding historical facts unless clearly erroneous. The 'ultimate inquiry' for custody is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest, judged by objective circumstances. The critical inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. In this case, LeBrun was explicitly told he was not under arrest and was free to leave multiple times, and he testified he understood this. He was never physically restrained, retained his cellular phone, called his wife from the interview room, was driven home, and not arrested that day. The court found that psychological ploys, the interview location, or the agents' intent are largely irrelevant to the custody determination unless they restrict a reasonable person's freedom to depart. LeBrun’s age, education (including one year of law school), work experience, and prior positive experiences with NCIS agents supported the conclusion that a reasonable person in his position would not have perceived a restraint on his freedom. Regarding voluntariness, a confession is involuntary if extracted by threats, violence, or promises sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination, judged by the totality of the circumstances. While agents made statements that LeBrun believed implied non-prosecution for 'spontaneous' murder, a defendant's mistaken belief, even if induced by agents, does not render a confession involuntary. A promise is merely one factor; the core inquiry is whether the authorities actually overbore the defendant's will. The confession occurred after only 33 minutes, and LeBrun had a subjective understanding of his Miranda rights. His sophistication and legal training weigh against a finding that his will was overborne, indicating he was a calculating person who perceived a loophole, rather than a vulnerable individual whose capacity for self-determination was impaired.
Dissenting - Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judge
Yes, Michael LeBrun's confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed, violating his due process rights. The dissent focuses on the voluntariness of the confession, arguing that LeBrun's will was overborne by the agents’ tactics. The district court found that the interrogation environment was police-dominated, with agents frequently raising their voices, bullying LeBrun, and displaying impatience. The dissent highlights that the agents threatened financial ruin, preyed on fears related to his cancer (not mentioned by the majority), and vividly described the negative impact of litigation on his family’s reputation and pregnant wife. The dissent contends that the agents’ statements directly induced LeBrun’s reasonable belief that he would not be prosecuted if he confessed to a 'spontaneous' murder, explicitly assuring him Muns' family approved of the 'deal' and would not pursue civil remedies. The agents also referred to an alleged statute of limitations difficulty for 'spontaneous' murder and intimated they would contact the U.S. Attorney to close the case. Further, the dissent notes the agents used knowing falsehoods, such as displaying a picture of Muns’ family at his gravesite, contriving a story about a suicide note implicating LeBrun, and claiming other 'haunted' witnesses existed. Crucially, the dissent emphasizes the district court’s factual finding that, despite initial assurances, LeBrun did not feel free to leave as the interview progressed, a finding supported by his testimony and weighing heavily against voluntariness. The dissent asserts that the government failed to carry its burden of showing the confession was voluntary, especially given that the admissibility of a confession also depends on whether extraction techniques are compatible with a system that presumes innocence, not solely if the will was overborne.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between merely coercive police interview tactics and those that establish 'custody' for Miranda purposes or render a confession 'involuntary' under the Due Process Clause. It reinforces the objective 'reasonable person' standard for custody, indicating that the subjective intent of officers or the location of the interview are less determinative than the suspect's perceived freedom to leave. The ruling sets a high bar for defendants to prove involuntariness, particularly for those who are educated, legally sophisticated, or have prior experience with law enforcement, underscoring that a mistaken belief about non-prosecution, even if induced, may not suffice to render a confession involuntary.
