United States v. Mettetal
34 F. App'x 215 (2002)
Rule of Law:
The Hyde Amendment imposes a strict, jurisdictional 30-day deadline for filing a motion for attorney's fees, which commences either upon the final judgment in the underlying criminal action (including voluntary dismissal without prejudice) or upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations for the underlying offense.
Facts:
- In May 1995, Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. submitted a falsified postal form to postal personnel, an act that completed all elements of an 18 U.S.C. § 1001 offense.
- In August 1995, a federal grand jury in the Middle District of Tennessee indicted Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. on one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
- In August 1995, Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. was arrested as part of an ongoing series of illegal activities related to the § 1001 charge.
- Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. was convicted of a more serious offense in a different federal jurisdiction.
Procedural Posture:
- In August 1995, a federal grand jury in the Middle District of Tennessee indicted Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. on one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
- After Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. was convicted of a more serious offense in a different federal jurisdiction, the government moved to voluntarily dismiss the indictment without prejudice.
- In January 1999, the district court (trial court) granted the government's motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice.
- In August 2000, Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. moved the district court for reimbursement of attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment.
- The district court denied Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr.'s motion, determining that it was untimely.
- Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. filed a timely appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does the 30-day jurisdictional period for filing a motion for attorney's fees under the Hyde Amendment commence upon the government's voluntary dismissal of an indictment, or does it extend until after the expiration of the statute of limitations for the underlying offense if re-indictment is possible?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, a motion for attorney's fees under the Hyde Amendment is not timely if filed more than 30 days after both the government's voluntary dismissal of an indictment and the expiration of the statute of limitations for the underlying offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that Mettetal's motion was untimely. Under the Hyde Amendment, motions for attorney's fees must be filed within 30 days of the 'final judgment' in the underlying action, and this deadline is a jurisdictional requirement. A 'final judgment' includes an order of voluntary dismissal, even if without prejudice. The district court correctly identified January 1999, the date of the voluntary dismissal, as the final judgment. Even accepting Mettetal's argument that final judgment did not occur until the statute of limitations expired due to the possibility of re-indictment, his motion was still untimely. The § 1001 offense was complete in May 1995 when Mettetal submitted the falsified postal form. Given the five-year statute of limitations for § 1001 offenses, the statute of limitations expired in May 2000. Mettetal filed his motion in August 2000, more than 30 days after both the January 1999 dismissal and the May 2000 expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the strict jurisdictional nature of the 30-day filing deadline for attorney's fees under the Hyde Amendment. It establishes that even a voluntary dismissal without prejudice constitutes a 'final judgment' for these purposes, commencing the 30-day clock. Furthermore, it provides an alternative endpoint for calculating the deadline—the expiration of the statute of limitations for the underlying offense—underscoring that potential re-indictment does not indefinitely postpone the 'finality' of the action. This decision emphasizes the importance of vigilance by litigants in determining the exact date their case concludes for fee recovery purposes, as courts will strictly enforce these deadlines.
