United States v. Meregildo
883 F.Supp.2d 523, 2012 WL 3264501 (2012)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A person has no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment for information voluntarily shared with others on a social media platform, even if privacy settings are used to limit access to a select group of "friends."
Facts:
- Melvin Colon maintained a Facebook profile under the name 'Mellymel Balia.'
- Colon configured his privacy settings to allow only his designated Facebook 'friends' to view his posts, photographs, and friend list.
- One of Colon's Facebook 'friends' was a cooperating witness for the government.
- The cooperating witness voluntarily granted the government access to view Colon's otherwise private Facebook profile.
- Through this access, government agents observed posts by Colon that included messages about prior acts of violence, threats to rival gang members, and communications with other alleged gang members.
Procedural Posture:
- As part of a grand jury investigation, the Government applied for a search warrant for the contents of Melvin Colon's Facebook account.
- The application for the warrant was supported by evidence obtained by viewing Colon's profile through a cooperating witness.
- A U.S. Magistrate Judge found probable cause and issued the search warrant.
- In the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Defendant Melvin Colon filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his Facebook account, arguing the government's initial access via the cooperating witness was an unconstitutional search.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the government from accessing a defendant's private Facebook profile, shared only with designated 'friends,' by using one of those 'friends' as a cooperating witness without a warrant?
Opinions:
Majority - Pauley, J.
No. The Fourth Amendment is not violated when the government accesses a social media profile through a cooperating witness who is a 'friend' of the user. A person's reasonable expectation of privacy ends when they disseminate information to third parties, because those parties are free to share that information with others, including the government. By sharing posts with his Facebook 'friends,' Colon assumed the risk that one of them might reveal that information. This is analogous to the 'false friend' doctrine, where an individual who confides in another person who is secretly a government informant has no Fourth Amendment protection for the misplaced confidence. Therefore, because Colon surrendered his expectation of privacy in the information he shared with his 'friends,' the government's warrantless viewing of his profile through the cooperating witness was not an unconstitutional search.
Analysis:
This case applies the long-standing third-party doctrine, established in a pre-digital context, to the modern realm of social media. The court's decision clarifies that privacy settings on platforms like Facebook do not create a constitutionally protected shield against disclosure by the very people a user chooses to share information with. This provides a clear avenue for law enforcement to gather evidence from semi-private online communications without a warrant, so long as they gain access through a user who was an intended recipient of the communication. The ruling reinforces the principle that what one voluntarily exposes to others, even a limited group, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of privacy standard.
