United States v. McMullin
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 18357, 576 F.3d 810, 2009 WL 2487077 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
When a law enforcement officer who has entered a home with consent exits the premises, completes the objective of the visit, and detains the homeowner outside, the initial consent does not extend to a subsequent, warrantless re-entry. A new consent or another exception to the warrant requirement is required for the second entry to be constitutional.
Facts:
- U.S. Marshals Sean Newlin and Dave Davis went to Gary McMullin's residence without a search warrant to locate a fugitive, Daryl Crowder.
- McMullin answered the door, and when Marshal Newlin asked, "May I come in and talk with you?", McMullin replied, "Yeah, sure, come on in."
- Inside, McMullin repeatedly told Newlin that only he and his uncle were present, despite evidence of a third person.
- While Newlin was inside, Marshal Davis located and apprehended Crowder in the backyard.
- Newlin exited the house into the backyard upon hearing the commotion and, after Crowder was secured, detained and handcuffed McMullin for lying about Crowder's presence.
- Newlin then said, "Well, let’s go back into the house and talk," and physically brought the handcuffed McMullin back inside the house.
- During this second entry into the kitchen, Newlin noticed ammunition in an ashtray, which led to him asking about and discovering several firearms.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted Gary McMullin for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- In the U.S. District Court, McMullin filed a motion to suppress the firearms evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
- A magistrate judge reviewed the motion and recommended its denial.
- The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied McMullin's motion to suppress.
- McMullin entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the court's ruling on the suppression motion.
- The district court sentenced McMullin to fifty-six months’ imprisonment.
- McMullin (appellant) appealed the denial of his motion to suppress to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, with the United States as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a homeowner's initial consent for a U.S. Marshal to enter his home remain valid for a second entry after the marshal has exited the house, accomplished the purpose of his visit by apprehending a fugitive in the backyard, and detained the homeowner?
Opinions:
Majority - Bright, J.
No. The second warrantless entry into McMullin's house violated the Fourth Amendment because the initial consent did not extend to the re-entry. The court reasoned that the issue was not whether McMullin withdrew consent, but whether a new consent was required after the circumstances materially changed. Marshal Newlin had exited the house, the purpose of the visit (locating Crowder) was complete, and McMullin was detained and handcuffed outside. Therefore, the scope of the original consent, which was for Newlin to "come in and talk," had been exceeded, and neither a new consent nor an exigent circumstance justified the re-entry.
Dissenting - Murphy, J.
Yes. The second entry was a lawful continuation of the initial consented presence because McMullin never unequivocally withdrew his consent. The dissent argued that the burden was on McMullin to revoke consent, which he failed to do through any act or statement. Furthermore, McMullin's lies about Crowder created a new, legitimate law enforcement purpose—investigating obstruction of justice—which justified further questioning inside the house. McMullin’s lack of objection and cooperation with the re-entry should be interpreted as continued consent.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the temporal and spatial limits of consent under the Fourth Amendment, establishing that consent is not a perpetual license for law enforcement to enter and exit a home. The ruling emphasizes that once officers leave a residence and the original purpose of their visit is fulfilled, the constitutional protection of the home is restored, and they must obtain new consent or have a separate legal justification for re-entry. This precedent requires officers to re-evaluate their authority before each entry, particularly when the factual circumstances have significantly changed, rather than relying on an initial grant of consent. It reinforces the high value the law places on the sanctity of the home against warrantless intrusions.
